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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Delaware courts have largely privatized enforcement of fiduciary duties in public 
corporations. In In re Fuqua Industries, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,1  Chancellor Chandler 
expressly acknowledged this judicial policy.  He noted that Delaware courts implement it partly 
by allowing private attorneys, working on a contingent fee basis, to initiate and maintain 
derivative and class actions in the names of “nominal shareholder plaintiffs.”2  Attorneys are 
subject only to the relatively weak constraints that they must inform their ‘clients’ and receive 
their consent before they file shareholder suits.  Further, Delaware courts use cost and fee 
shifting mechanisms to “economically incentivize”3 those attorneys to initiate such suits.4    
 
 Chancellor Chandler also explained that Delaware courts have adopted this policy 
because they believe that the plaintiffs’ bar is capable of performing a valuable “service on 
behalf of shareholders.”5 Plaintiffs’ attorneys understand “abstruse issues of corporate 
governance and fiduciary duties”6 far better than do most shareholders.  Consequently, they are 
uniquely qualified to identify situations in which principles of corporate governance have been 
violated or fiduciary duties have been breached and then to initiate lawsuits seeking corrective 
action.7
 
 At the same time, Delaware courts recognize that encouraging private enforcement 
 
    1 752 A.2d 126 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
    2 Id. at 133. Chancellor Chandler describes such suits as “a cornerstone of sound corporate 
governance. Id. He explains that Delaware’s allowance of such suits safeguards corporations from 
fiduciary breaches and thus benefits shareholders. Id. 
    3 Id. 
4 In this article. we refer to the attorneys who specialize in filing class and derivative actions on 
behalf of nominal shareholders as “plaintiffs’ attorneys,” the “plaintiffs’ bar” or the “traditional 
plaintiffs’ bar.” 
 
    5 Id. 
    6 Id. at 135. 
    7 Although Chancellor Chandler did not mention it, a more pragmatic factor may underlie the 
Delaware courts approach. Those courts may believe that it would be inappropriate to allow 
defendants to inquire very deeply about communications between plaintiffs’ attorneys and their 
clients concerning which of them actually was responsible for any given decision to sue. 
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creates an obvious danger.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys may make litigation-related decisions primarily 
to advance their own economic interests rather than those of the corporations or shareholders that 
they purport to represent.8 Such decisions have the potential to impose substantial, litigation-
related agency costs on corporations, shareholders and the courts.9
 
 Concerns about possible litigation-related agency costs have led Delaware’s courts to 
impose two major constraints on shareholder derivative suits. They have interpreted with 
considerable rigor the long-standing requirement that a derivative plaintiff must either make 
demand on the defendant corporation’s board of directors or plead with particularity why 
demand would be futile.10 In addition, they have held that a special litigation committee, 
appointed by a defendant corporation’s board of directors, has the right to investigate plaintiff’s 
claims and to seek dismissal of a derivative suit, even where plaintiff has established that 
demand is excused.11 One explicit purpose of both these requirements is to weed out 
opportunistic claims — often referred to as “strike suits” — that may generate substantial fee 
awards without producing meaningful benefits for the defendant corporation or its 
shareholders.12  
 
 Neither Delaware courts nor Delaware’s legislature has imposed comparable constraints 
on shareholder class actions, the other principal form of representative shareholder litigation.13 
Yet, as Professors Thompson and Thomas point out in their innovative study of lawsuits filed in 
Delaware Chancery Court in the years 1999-2000, class actions and, in particular, acquisition-
 
    8 Id. at 133. 
    9 Id. at 134. 
    10 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (holding that complaint making generalized 
allegations that directors were dominated and controlled not sufficient to demonstrate demand would 
be futile because relevant facts not pled with sufficient particularity), establishing a pleading 
standard for demand futility that Delaware courts have applied in numerous subsequent cases. 
    11 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
    12 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811; Zapata, 430 A.2d at 786. This agency-cost problem exists in 
large part because derivative claims often have the potential to impose far higher litigation costs on 
defendants than they do on plaintiffs and their attorneys. 
    13 In contrast, Congress has imposed substantial constraints on class actions filed under the federal 
securities laws, most notably by passing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. 
L. No.104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Among other 
things, that Act imposes new obligations on plaintiffs that file securities class actions, establishes 
procedures that allow class members with large financial interests to gain control of such actions, 
and requires plaintiffs to meet stringent pleading requirements before discovery can begin. 
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related class actions appear to have become “the dominant form of corporate litigation, 
outnumbering derivative suits by a wide margin.”14 Whether the apparent preference of the 
plaintiffs’ bar for class action arises from a lack of constraints on opportunistic litigation,  from a 
proliferation of wrongdoing in connection with mergers and acquisitions, or from both, is 
unclear. 
 
 At the time we first became aware of Thompson and Thomas’s findings, we were in the 
early stages of a study of one category of merger-related class actions that we believed was 
particularly vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs’ bar — suits challenging so-
called “sales of control.”15 We had become interested in this area as a consequence of the 
experience of one of us in connection with two class actions challenging the fairness of 
transactions, seemingly negotiated at arm’s length, in which Delaware corporations were sold for 
cash.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys filed complaints in both suits almost immediately after the challenged 
transactions were announced.  In neither suit, however, did plaintiffs’ attorneys  find any 
evidence to support their claims that the corporation had been sold for less than the highest value 
reasonably available.  As a result, in neither case did they obtain any monetary recovery for the 
plaintiff class.  Instead, both cases settled because defendants agreed to disclose additional 
information that, in both cases, indicated that defendants had sought and obtained the highest 
value reasonably available for the subject corporation’s stockholders.  However, despite the 
absence of any evidence of wrongdoing, defendants or their successors in both cases agreed not 
only to settle but also to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses, up to agreed-upon amounts, 
if awarded by the court. 
 
 As a member of the plaintiff class in one of these suits, Steiner v.  CalMat Co.,16 and as 
counsel to one of his colleagues who was a member of the plaintiff class in the second, In re 
Banctec, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,17 Professor Weiss prepared objections to both settlements. 
In both cases, the objections focused on plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee request.  Both objectors argued 
that no fees should be awarded because plaintiffs’ attorneys initially filed complaints without 
having any reasonable factual basis for the claims they had made, that plaintiffs had found no 
 
    14 Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, ___ Vand. L.Rev. ___, [5] (2003). 
    15 That term is defined in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 
(Del. 1994) (hereinafter "QVC"). What constitutes a sale of control is discussed at greater length at 
notes __-__, infra, as is the fact that once a transaction qualifies as a sale of control, the selling 
corporation’s directors have duties — often described as “Revlon duties,” see Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) — to make reasonable efforts to 
obtain the highest value reasonably available for the selling corporation’s shareholders. 
    16 C.A. 16783 (1999). 
    17 C.A. 17092 (2000). The colleague was Professor Junius Hoffman. 
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evidence of wrongdoing, and that the settlements in question provided no meaningful benefits to 
the plaintiff class.18  
 
 Although both objections achieved substantial success,19 what seemed more significant to 
us was that Delaware law appeared to make it attractive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file class 
actions challenging “sale-of-control” transactions whether or not fiduciary breaches appeared to 
have occurred.  A complaint that simply asserted that a corporation’s board had approved a 
“sale-of-control” and that then alleged in general terms that the directors had not obtained “the 
best value reasonably available” could not be dismissed because, under Delaware law, such 
allegations sufficed to shift to defendant directors the burden of proving that they had not 
violated their Revlon duties.20  Moreover, compendia of unreported decisions that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in both cases filed in support of their fee requests suggested to us that many other class 
actions had been filed on the basis of similar generalized allegations of wrongdoing, had also 
been settled for non-monetary relief and — in the absence of an objection by a “gadfly” such as 
Professor Weiss— had resulted in substantial attorney’s fee awards.21 In effect, we began to 
 
    18 Both objections relied heavily on Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876 (Del. 
1980) and Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966). Dann held that, to guard against the 
danger that the prospect of fee awards would encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to file baseless claims, a 
plaintiff’s attorney must demonstrate both that the action (or the settlement) confers some benefit 
upon the corporation or the class and that the action, when filed, was meritorious. Id. at 387. The 
Court explained that  
 A claim is meritorious within the meaning of the rule if it can withstand a motion to 
dismiss on the pleadings [and] if, at the same time, the plaintiff possesses knowledge 
of provable facts which hold out some reasonable likelihood of ultimate success. 
Id.; see also Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d at 879 . 
  
    19 Plaintiffs’ attorneys requested $525,000 in fees and expenses in CalMat; the court awarded fees 
and expenses of $175,000. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ requested $250,000 in fees and expense in Banctec; 
the court awarded $25,000. 
    20 See note __, supra. In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 
1995), established that where Delaware law imposes on a corporation’s board of directors the burden 
of proving that some action it has taken comported with the relevant standard of review, a complaint 
alleging in general terms that the directors’ action did not comport with that standard of review states 
a claim for which relief can be granted. Id. at ___.  The defendant directors then must prove that 
their conduct comported with the relevant standard of review. The Delaware Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed this rule in Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 284-85 (Del. 2003) (compliant that alleges 
facts sufficient to suggest defendant directors bear burden of proving that merger was approved by a 
committee of independent directors cannot be dismissed because defendants cannot satisfy their 
burden at pleading stage of lawsuit). 
    21 Plaintiffs’ attorneys in both CalMat and Banctec filed (and served on Weiss) compendia of 
unreported decisions awarding such attorneys’ fees. The cases included in those compendia 
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suspect that, at least with respect to sale-of-control transactions, Delaware law created a sort of 
safe harbor for strike suits. That is, Delaware law made it too easy for plaintiffs’ attorneys, in 
connection with any sale-of-control transaction, to initiate a class action that would have 
significant settlement value.   Plaintiffs’ attorneys could threaten the timing of the transaction 
and impose on the board of the selling corporation the litigation costs involved in proving that it 
had proceeded in accord with its duties under Revlon.22  
 
 Examination of a preliminary draft of Thompson and Thomas’s paper led us to broaden 
the scope of our study.  Thompson and Thomas found that most of the class actions filed in 
1999-2000 were directed at mergers that involved some conflict of interest — a squeeze out by a 
controlling shareholder, a management buy out (MBO), or a sale of control to a third party in 
connection with which the selling corporation’s managers allegedly diverted a disproportionate 
share of the proceeds to themselves.  Relatively few class actions challenged sales of control in 
the absence of self-dealing.  We had already hypothesized that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decisions 
concerning whether to file and how to prosecute merger-related class actions resulted primarily 
from Delaware law — in particular, that the pleading rules, burden of proof and standard of 
review made it easy to file a claim that would survive a motion to dismiss and provide plaintiffs 
with economic leverage to press for a settlement and a fee award, regardless of whether fiduciary 
duties had been breached.  Thompson and Thomas’s data led us to hypothesize further that the 
presence of a conflict of interest in connection with a merger would make it more attractive for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to file a class action because unfair self-dealing was more likely to have 
occurred.  In our view, that potential also made it more likely that class actions challenging 
mergers involving conflicts of interest had produced substantial benefits for members of the 
plaintiff class as well as the attorneys who filed them. 
 
 We further revised our hypotheses after we began to examine litigation documents.  They 
revealed that during the three-year study period, boards of target companies in mergers involving 
conflicts of interest routinely appointed special negotiating committees (“SNCs”) composed of 
 
suggested that objections were unlikely because defendants customarily agreed to pay any attorneys’ 
fees awarded, rather than to require that they be paid by class members or from some common fund. 
Thus, class members had no economic incentive to object. See Text at notes __-__, infra. 
    22 We also suspected that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. 
v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 116 S.Ct. 873 (1996), gave plaintiffs an additional bargaining chip. 
Matsushita held that a federal court must give full faith and credit to a court-approved settlement of 
a state law class action, even if the settlement releases defendants from federal claims that plaintiffs 
could not have asserted in the state court action. Thus, Matsushita could allow a plaintiffs’ attorney 
who filed a class action in Delaware challenging a sale of control to offer defendants, as part of any 
settlement, a release from any and all claims that have been filed or might be filed, in any state or 
federal court, challenging any aspect of the sale-of-control transaction. We found, however, that the 
possibility of obtaining such a release does not appear to be significant. See text at notes ___-___, 
infra. 
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independent directors and charged those committees with responsibility for negotiating the best 
possible terms on behalf of the company’s public shareholders.23 Plaintiffs’ attorneys, however, 
routinely filed class actions challenging such mergers as soon as they were announced, without 
regard to whether the target company’s board had appointed a SNC or agreed to final terms.  
Moreover, if plaintiffs file a suit anticipating a target’s board will breach its fiduciary duties, and 
if a SNC subsequently negotiates some improvement in the terms of a proposed merger (as often 
is the case), Delaware law presumes that the improvement is attributable in whole or in part from 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ efforts.24 Consequently, even if plaintiffs’ attorneys accept as fair the 
merger terms a SNC has negotiated, Delaware law allows them to seek compensation for the 
benefits that their lawsuit is presumed to have generated.25
 
    23 This practice became standard in squeeze outs following Weinberger v. UOP, Inc,, 457 A.2d 
701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983), in which the court indicated that the appointment of a SNC would go a 
long way toward proving that a squeeze out was entirely fair. Professor Rock has documented that 
by 1990, reliance on SNCs also had become standard practice in connection with MBOs. See 
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 U.C.L.A. 
L.Rev. 1009 (1997). 
    24 Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1164 (Del. 1989) (establishing principle in 
connection with a derivative suit); United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 693 A.2d 1076 
(Del. 1997) (affirming that Tandycrafts applies to merger-related class actions). 
    25 In United Vanguard Fund, supra, a mutual fund whose challenge to a merger agreement had 
been mooted when the corporation agreed to be acquired at a higher price brought suit for 
reimbursement of attorney fees it had paid, claiming that its efforts had contributed to the improved 
result. The Chancery Court denied the shareholder’s claim and granted the target company’s motion 
for summary judgment, holding that the benefit was not causally related to the lawsuit. The Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded. It explained: 
 Where, as here, a corporate defendant, after a complaint is filed, takes action that renders the 
claims asserted in the complaint moot, Delaware law imposes on it the burden of persuasion 
to show that no causal connection existed between the initiation of the suit and any later 
benefit to the shareholders. This rebuttable presumption exists because it is the “defendant, 
and not the plaintiff, who is in a position to know the reasons, events and decisions leading 
up to the defendant's action.”  Defendants, therefore, have the burden of rebutting the 
presumption by demonstrating that the lawsuit “did not in any way cause their action.”  On 
a motion for summary judgment, a defendant's burden is particularly heavy, because it must 
show on undisputed facts that the assertions of the lawsuit had no causative effect on the 
subsequent benefit.   
Id. at 1080 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  
 
 On remand, the Chancery Court found defendants had not met their burden and awarded 
attorney fees to plaintiff. United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 727 A.2d 844 (Del. Ch. 
1998). 
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 This combination of corporate practice and Delaware law provides plaintiffs’ attorneys 
with substantial leverage in mergers involving conflicts of interest.  Unless defendants both are 
confident that they can prove a negative --- that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ efforts had no impact on 
any improved terms negotiated by a SNC --- and are further prepared to incur the litigation costs 
involved in defending a suit seeking attorneys’ fees, negotiating an agreement to pay plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees probably will appear to present  an attractive alternative.  Thus, in most mergers 
involving conflicts of interest and especially in mergers involving sales of control, the 
combination of corporate practice and Delaware law appears to have provided plaintiffs’ 
attorneys with substantial incentives to file class actions, regardless of whether it appeared that 
fiduciary duties had been or would be breached.26
 
 We also recognized, though, that the mere presence of these incentives to pursue 
opportunistic litigation did not necessarily mean that plaintiffs’ attorneys had been acting as 
“unfaithful champions”27 of shareholders’ interests.  After analyzing all “acquisition-related 
class actions” 28 in Delaware Chancery Court in 1999-2000 from a somewhat different 
perspective, Thompson and Thomas concluded that although such suits generate significant 
litigation-related agency costs, they also produce large enough reductions in managerial agency 
costs to “deserve a seat at the table of corporate governance.”29  
 
 To reach our own conclusion as to whether the costs associated with merger-related class 
actions outweighed their benefits, we undertook to examine intensively all merger-related class 
actions filed in Delaware Chancery Court with respect to mergers announced between January 1, 
1999, and December 31, 2001.30 We chose to cover a three-year period, rather than the two-year 
 
    26 Similar potential to free ride on the efforts of others would exist where plaintiffs’ attorneys 
challenged sales of control or defensive actions and the target company subsequently was acquired 
at a higher price. 
    27 We draw this term from John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor 
in Shareholder Litigation, 48-Sum L. & Contemp. Prob. 5 (1985). 
    28 We use the term “merger-related class actions” to refer to suits challenging a transaction in 
which one or more corporations is being acquired by or combined with another. It is our 
understanding that Thompson and Thomas use the term “acquisition-related class actions” to refer to 
a somewhat broader class of suits, including those challenging takeover defenses unrelated to any 
negotiated acquisition or merger. 
  29 Thompson & Thomas, supra note __, at __. 
    30 We limited our study to mergers involving at least $100 million, based on conversations with 
members of the plaintiffs’ bar that led us to conclude that financial considerations made it 
considerably less likely that plaintiffs’ attorneys would file class actions challenging mergers that 
fell below that threshold. 
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period of the Thompson and Thomas study, to increase the statistical reliability of our results. At 
the same time, we thought that it would be useful for the period of our study to overlap with that 
of Thompson and Thomas’s study.  We also anticipated (correctly, as it turned out) that this was 
the latest three-year period in which almost all merger-related class actions that were filed had 
been resolved.  Finally, the relevant principles of Delaware law and corporate practices during 
this period remained relatively stable.  We would not need to adjust our observations to take 
account of possible changes in Delaware law or corporate practices. 
 
 We based our study on the neo-classical assumption that plaintiffs’ attorneys are rational 
economic actors who, because they generally operate without meaningful client control, make 
litigation-related decisions primarily to advance their own economic interests.31 However, unlike 
the Delaware courts, which additionally appear to believe that they can curb attorney 
opportunism through judicial monitoring of settlements and fee awards, our model assumed that 
other aspects of Delaware law largely shaped plaintiffs’ attorneys’ litigation-related decisions.  
More specifically, we assumed that an analysis of the pleading standards of Delaware merger 
law, including burden of proof and standard of review, would allow us to predict the kinds of 
mergers most likely to lead plaintiffs’ attorneys to file class action complaints, which merger-
related lawsuits they were most likely to prosecute actively, and when and on what terms those 
lawsuits were most likely to be settled.32
 
 We then examined all mergers within our research universe and all class actions filed 
with respect to those mergers to see if they bore out our predictions. We made no predictions as 
to the effectiveness of judicial monitoring, but we did attempt to assess how effective it had 
been. Our overall conclusions are that Delaware law relating to mergers and class actions created 
a litigation environment that was rife with potential for opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs’ 
bar; that plaintiffs’ attorneys generally responded by behaving opportunistically; and that 
Delaware’s courts did not effectively protect corporations or their shareholders from the 
resulting litigation-related agency costs.33
 
    31 Many other scholars have analyzed corporate representative litigation from the same economic 
perspective. See, e.g., Coffee, Champion, cited in note __; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through 
Class and Derivative Actions , 86 Colum. L.Rev. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991). 
    32 Our model is consistent with one developed by Guy Halfteck, in which he hypothesizes that 
“[c]lass action law enforcement involves a multi-stage sequence of options to invest (similar to 
financial call options) under conditions of uncertainty.” Guy Halfteck, The Law Enforcement 
Venture: Understanding the Effects of Investment in Class Actions on Corporate Liability Exposure 
(2004), avail. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=497442. 
    33 In Fuqua, Chancellor Chandler made clear that the litigation system that the Delaware courts 
have created depends on the Chancery Court to take responsibility for ensuring that those agency 
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 The balance of this paper proceeds as follows.  Part II describes the different categories 
of mergers that we studied, the principles of Delaware law applicable to those mergers and to 
merger-related class actions, and the practices that Delaware corporations generally follow in 
arranging such mergers.  It also contains our predictions as to what mergers are most likely to be 
challenged by class actions, which class actions are most likely to be prosecuted, and what basis 
those class actions are most likely to be resolved.  Part III describes our research methodology 
and describes and assesses our findings.  Part IV concludes. 
 
 
 
II.  DELAWARE LAW AND LITIGATION INCENTIVES 
 
 
 Delaware law can be viewed as initially dividing mergers, acquisitions, and other 
business combinations — which we shall refer to collectively as “mergers” — into two basic 
categories and then sub-dividing mergers in each of those categories into sub-categories.  The 
basic division is between mergers negotiated at arm’s length and those that involve a conflict of 
interest. Such conflicts exist either because an officer, director or controlling shareholder of the 
company being acquired is or is affiliated with the other party to the merger or because the 
merger allegedly involves some side deal with an officer, director, or controlling shareholder of 
the target company.  Within the arm’s-length category, Delaware courts apply different standards 
of review to those applied to mergers that involve a “sale of control,” mergers directed at fending 
off hostile takeover bids, and mergers that do not involve either a sale of control or any defensive 
action.  Within the conflict-of-interest category, Delaware courts apply different standards of 
review to mergers in which the acquiror is a controlling shareholder (“squeeze outs”), mergers in 
which officers or directors of the target company have an ownership stake in the acquiror but do 
not control the target (“management buy outs” or “MBOs”), and mergers in connection with 
which an officer or director of the company being acquired has some other financial interest that 
conflicts with the interests of that company’s public shareholders.  Analysis is further 
complicated by variations in standards of review in Delaware courts, which depend on whether 
the merger involves only a tender offer or whether it also involves a merger consummated 
pursuant to section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) (a “statutory 
merger”), a merger consummated pursuant to section 253 of the DGCL (a “short form merger”) 
or some other action by the target company’s board of directors.   
 
 A.  Mergers Negotiated at Arm’s Length 
 
 A merger negotiated at arms length with an unrelated acquiror is unlikely to involve 
financial unfairness.  Neither the officers nor the directors of the target company have any 
incentive to agree to a transaction that is not in shareholders’ best interests.  Both the 
 
costs are not “borne by society, defendant corporations, directors or the courts.” 752 A.2d at 134. 
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requirement for approval from a majority of the target’s shareholders and the fact that an 
unrelated shareholder’s “friendly” tender offer will succeed only if a majority of the target’s 
shareholders tender their stock further reduce the potential for abuse of shareholders’ interests.  
Thus, one might anticipate that all board decisions to approve mergers involving unrelated 
acquirors will be protected from judicial scrutiny by the business judgment rule — i.e., that a 
court will presume that the board agreed to the merger in good faith and after reasonable 
investigation.  A class action complaint challenging such a merger then would be unlikely to 
survive a motion to dismiss unless the complaint alleged with particularity facts that, if true, 
would raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the presumptions of the business judgment rule 
applied.34 A complaint asserting no more than generalized claims that the board’s decision was 
unwise, imprudent or uninformed clearly would not survive.   
 
 Delaware courts, however, do not treat all board decisions to approve arm’s-length 
mergers as protected business judgments.  Rather, they distinguish between mergers that involve 
“sales of control” and those that do not.  Unless plaintiff can show that the merger or some 
provision of the merger agreement serves a defensive purpose, the business judgment rule will 
insulate from judicial scrutiny a decision to approve a merger that does not involve a sale of 
control.35 But if a merger involves a sale of control, Delaware courts will subject the board’s 
decision to “enhanced scrutiny.”36 More specifically, they will require the defendant directors to 
bear the burden of proving that they acted reasonably to seek the transaction offering the best 
value reasonably available to the target company’s shareholders.37 The business judgment rule 
 
    34 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812: 
 The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of 
Delaware directors under Section 141(a). It is a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse 
of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party 
challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption. 
    35 I.e., is designed to fend off a hostile takeover bid or bids. See Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (supporting both propositions). 
    36 QVC defines the “key features of an enhanced scrutiny test” as: 
 (a) a judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decision making process employed 
by the directors, including the information on which the directors based their decision; and 
(b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors’ action in light of the 
circumstances then existing. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45. 
QVC further holds that “The directors have the burden of proving that they were adequately 
informed and acted reasonably.” Id. 
    37 Corporate lawyers and Delaware courts often refer to this as proving that the directors met their 
“Revlon duties,” see Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1997), 
and we shall frequently use this shorthand term to refer to this fiduciary obligation. 
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will protect the directors’ approval of sale only if they meet that burden.   
 
 Whether a merger involves a sale of control thus is a matter of critical doctrinal 
importance.  The Delaware courts’ rationale for holding that sales of control are subject to 
enhanced scrutiny is that shareholders’ voting rights are of overriding importance, because they 
constitute the principal mechanism of shareholder participation in corporate governance.  
Consequently, shareholders should be compensated if and when the corporation enters into a 
transaction  — a “sale of control” — that will result in the loss of these governance rights.38 Any 
merger in which shareholders receive only cash or debt instruments in exchange for their stock 
thus qualifies as a sale of control,39 as does any merger in which the target’s shareholders receive 
stock in a corporation that, after the merger, will be controlled by a single person, entity, or 
cohesive group.40 On the other hand, when a corporation with no controlling shareholder 
participates in a merger in which its shareholders will receive stock for their stock and control of 
the surviving corporation will continue to reside in “a large, fluid changing and changeable 
[public] market,” no sale of control will be deemed to have occurred. The business judgment rule 
then will apply,41 unless the merger serves a defensive purpose.   
 
 Delaware courts review stock-for-stock mergers that serve a defensive purpose under 
what is known as the Unocal standard.42 They require the directors of the corporation taking the 
defensive action to demonstrate both that “a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness 
existed” and that the defensive measure is “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”43 
However, if “a defensive measure is not draconian  . . . because it is not either coercive or 
preclusive,” then in most circumstances a Delaware court will find it to be reasonable.44
 
    38 Id. at 42-43. 
    39 Unless the corporation already has a controlling shareholder. 
    40 Id. at 43. 
    41 Id. at 46. Professor Lawrence Hamermesh has found that the premiums paid in stock-for-stock 
mergers do not differ substantially from those paid in cash mergers, which are classified as “sales of 
control.” He suggests that this rough equivalence calls into question the very different standards of 
review that Delaware courts apply to mergers that do or do not involve sales of control. See 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh,  Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the 
Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. Penna. L.Rev. 881 (2003). 
    42 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
    43 Unocal, 493 A. 2d at 955. 
    44 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995). As the court further 
explained, “The fact that an action must not be coercive or preclusive does not prevent a board from 
responding defensively before a bidder is at the corporate bastion’s gate.” Id. (Footnote omitted). 
  
 
 12
                        
 
 As regards arm’s-length mergers that involved sales of control, we predicted that the 
applicable standard of review and burden of proof would make it attractive for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to file class actions alleging that the directors of the selling corporations had breached 
their Revlon duties.  A complaint that alleged the facts of the proposed sale of control and made 
such a generalized allegation would shift to the defendant directors the burden of proving that 
they had met their Revlon duties.  That alone, we estimated, would provide plaintiffs’ attorneys 
with sufficient leverage in some cases to extract a non-monetary settlement.  However, because 
nothing would prevent both the target company’s board and its shareholders from seeking the 
highest value reasonably available, and because Revlon duties are in a sense self-enforcing,45 we 
also predicted that few class actions challenging arm’s-length sales of control would result in any 
monetary recovery for the plaintiff class and that, in at least some cases, defendants convinced 
that they had not breached their Revlon duties would signal their intent to contest plaintiff’s 
claims.  Moreover, the biggest potential payoff for a plaintiffs’ attorney filing a class action 
challenging a sale of control was likely to occur where, for one reason or another, a competing 
bidder emerged and the company thereafter was sold for a higher price.  In that event, a 
plaintiffs’ attorney — even if her original claim that Revlon duties had been breached had no 
reasonable basis — nonetheless would be in a position to claim a share of the credit for the 
higher price and a fee award for her efforts. 
 
 Consequently, we hypothesized, Delaware law made it moderately attractive for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to file suits challenging sales of control. They could do so at relatively low 
cost, they might thereafter find it easy to extract non-monetary settlements (and related fee 
awards) even if no wrongdoing could be found,46 and they might even “hit the jackpot” if a 
competing bidder emerged.  At the same time, especially because defendants who were confident 
that they had met their Revlon duties often would be in a position to resist successfully such 
claims without incurring substantial litigation costs,47 we anticipated that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
 
    45 That is, an announcement that a board has agreed to a sale of control effectively puts a “for 
sale” sign on a company, in that its board then has little ability to resist a higher offer from some 
third party. Consequently, before agreeing to and announcing a sale of control, a well-counseled 
board will first conduct an appropriate market check or survey of potential buyers. 
  46 A defendant corporation also may find it attractive to settle such a case not only to avoid 
litigation-related expenses but also because such settlements invariably include broad releases of 
all claims that have been or could be brought in connection with the merger. They thus provide 
defendants with a form of “litigation insurance.” 
 
    47 If the selling corporation had a provision in its articles of incorporation exculpating directors 
from monetary liability for breaches of their duty of care, see DGCL § 102(b)(7), then a suit alleging 
violation of those directors’ Revlon duties would be highly unlikely to result in an award of 
monetary damages. Once the merger closed, defendants could seek judgment on the pleadings, 
because then the issue would be whether plaintiffs had alleged bad faith or self-dealing, not whether 
defendants had met their Revlon duties. See McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492 (Del.Ch. 
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would elect not to prosecute actively a significant proportion of the complaints that they filed 
challenging sales of control.  Rather, unless a competing bidder emerged (or some other 
unanticipated event or revelation occurred), we expected that plaintiffs’ attorneys would dismiss 
voluntarily a significant proportion of the complaints challenging such mergers that they filed. 
 
 We also recognized that it occasionally is difficult to determine whether an arm’s-length 
merger involves a sale of control.  Examples include mergers in which the target’s shareholders 
receive some combination of stock and cash (or debt) and mergers in which it is unclear whether 
a single person or entity or a cohesive group will control the surviving corporation.48 When a 
class action is filed challenging such a “hybrid” merger, some initial skirmishing is likely over 
whether Revlon duties apply.  This will make challenging a hybrid merger less attractive to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys than challenging a clear sale of control, but more attractive than challenging 
a stock-for-stock merger that does not involve a sale of control.  On the other hand, the board 
that negotiates a hybrid merger may well be more concerned with factors such as “strategic fit,” 
rather than with obtaining the highest value reasonably available, especially if it does not believe 
that Revlon duties apply.  Thus, a monetary recovery may be more likely if a class action is filed 
challenging a hybrid merger and plaintiffs prevail on the sale of control issue.  On balance, that 
possibility led us to predict that suits challenging hybrid mergers were somewhat less likely to be 
filed than suits challenging clear sales of control, but considerably more likely to be filed than 
suits challenging stock-for-stock mergers.  We also predicted that successful, Revlon-based 
challenges to hybrid mergers were more likely than challenges to sales of control to result in 
monetary recoveries.49
 
 The transactional form of an arm’s-length merger is not likely to affect the foregoing 
analysis.  Whether a sale of control involves a merger or a tender offer is unlikely to be 
significant because, so long as the target company’s board takes some action to facilitate the 
transaction, the action it took will be subject to enhanced scrutiny under Revlon.  Similarly, if a 
board agrees to a stock-for-stock merger that does not involve a sale of control, its actions will 
be reviewed under the business judgment rule in all but one set of circumstances, i.e., when a 
court could conclude that the target’s board agreed to the merger or to deal protection measures 
 
2000). Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ most promising tactic in such a case would be to seek to enjoin 
preliminarily the proposed sale of control. However, in the absence of strong evidence that the 
defendant directors had breached their Revlon duties, plaintiff probably would find it difficult to 
persuade the Chancery Court to issue a preliminary injunction. Moreover,  prosecuting a motion for 
a preliminary injunction would require an expenditure of considerable time and effort by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys. 
    48 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock 
Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. Law. 919 (2001). 
    49 However, because hybrid mergers are relatively rare, we also recognized that we were unlikely 
to find many cases in this category. 
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primarily to protect the target company from an uninvited takeover bid by some other aspiring 
acquiror. 
 
 As noted above, Delaware law allows boards of directors considerable freedom to take 
defensive actions, so long as they are not preclusive or coercive.50 Although challenges to 
defensive measures usually fail,51 plaintiffs’ attorneys still may find it attractive, for entirely 
pragmatic reasons, to file complaints challenging stock-for-stock mergers that serve defensive 
purposes.  Even if it has installed impregnable takeover defenses,52 the board of a target 
company will often give in to the pressures of the marketplace and abandon its defenses when a 
hostile bid gets high enough.  A plaintiffs’ attorney who has filed a class action challenging that 
company’s  takeover defenses then can claim credit for the target’s surrender and demand a fee 
equal to at least a modest percentage of the higher price that shareholders receive, which may, in 
total, amount to hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars.  Thus, we predicted that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys would find it attractive to file class actions challenging stock-for-stock 
mergers when, at the time the merger was announced or shortly thereafter, a competitive, hostile 
bid for the target corporation had been made or seemed reasonably likely.  If a contest for control 
then developed, the plaintiffs’ attorney could continue to prosecute that claim but would, in all 
probability, largely free-ride on the litigation efforts of the hostile bidder.  Such a suit, however, 
was likely to lead to the plaintiff class’s realizing a very substantial monetary benefit and to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ receiving a very substantial fee award.  Where no contest for control 
developed, though, we predicted that plaintiffs’ attorneys would elect to dismiss voluntarily 
complaints challenging defensive mergers, since they would find it difficult to succeed on the 
merits. 
 
 We also predicted that a similar dynamic would govern challenges to stock-for-stock 
mergers that did not involve either a sale of control or any defensive measure.  Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys might find it attractive to file class actions challenging such mergers, especially where 
the company being acquired was large in size, in the hope that a contest for control would 
develop after the merger was announced and the attorneys filing such suits then would realize 
windfall profits largely as a consequence of the efforts of the competing bidder.  On the other 
hand, we anticipated that absent the emergence of a competing bid, plaintiffs’ attorneys would 
voluntarily dismiss virtually all such suits, since a complaint challenging such a merger would be 
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the business judgment rule, and thus would provide 
 
    50 See text at notes ___-___, supra. 
    51 Delaware law in this area is quite complex. A full explication of the relevant principles is not 
necessary here, because decisions to challenge stock-for-stock mergers that involve such defensive 
measures are more likely to be based on the pragmatic considerations outlined infra in the text. 
    52 For example, the combination of a classified board of directors and a poison pill.  See Lucian 
Bebchuk, John Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Anti-Takeover Power of Classified Boards: 
Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 Stan. L.Rev. ___ (2002). 
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plaintiffs’ attorneys with very little litigation leverage. 
 
 B.  Mergers Involving Conflicts of Interest 
 
 As we noted above, Delaware courts apply different standards of review to squeeze outs, 
MBOs and mergers involving other conflicts of interest than they do to mergers negotiated at 
arm’s length.  As concerns squeeze outs, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.53 holds that a controlling 
shareholder bears the burden of proving that the merger is “entirely fair.” This is commonly 
described as the most rigorous standard of review applied under Delaware corporate law.54
 
 Weinberger explains that entire fairness includes two elements, fair dealing and fair 
price, but provides no real guidance as to how those two elements interact.55 However, the 
court’s opinion hints strongly that a controlling shareholder’s best approach is to cause or allow 
the target company’s board of directors to appoint a SNC with the authority to negotiate the 
terms of the squeeze out on behalf of the target’s public shareholders.56
 
 Unsurprisingly, it soon became standard operating procedure for the board of a controlled 
corporation to create a SNC whenever a controlling shareholder announced its intent to squeeze 
out the public shareholders and for the SNC then to retain legal and financial advisors to assist it 
in negotiating with the controlling shareholder.57  Practitioners generally viewed such actions as 
necessary, though not sufficient, to demonstrate that a squeeze out was entirely fair.   
 
 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.58 largely resolved a related uncertainty — 
how proof that a SNC had effectively represented the interests of public shareholders would 
affect the standard of review and burden of proof that Weinberger had established.  Lynch I held 
that proof of fair dealing, meaning that the terms of a squeeze out had been negotiated at arm’s-
length by a SNC with real bargaining power, would shift to a shareholder challenging the merger 
 
    53 457 A.2d 701 (Del 1983). 
    54 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. 
Penna. L.Rev. 785, (2003). 
    55 The court states only that “the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one between fair dealing and 
price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire 
fairness.” Id. at 711. 
    56 See id. at 709, n.7. 
57 We are aware of no post-Weinberger case involving a squeeze out in which a SNC was not 
appointed. 
 
    58 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (“Lynch I”). 
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the burden of proving that any price to which the SNC had agreed was not entirely fair.59
 
 However, if a controlling shareholder decided to attempt to effect a squeeze out using a 
tender offer without first obtaining the support of the controlled subsidiary’s board of directors, 
then Weinberger would not apply.  Rather, Solomon v. Pathe Communications60 held that a 
controlling shareholder had no duty to offer a fair price; its fiduciary obligations were limited to 
avoiding “coercion or disclosure violations.”61 When a controlling shareholder’s tender offer 
would be deemed to be coercive was not explained, nor did any other reported decision discuss 
that issue until late in 2001.  Thus, as to this one category of mergers — a squeeze out effected 
by a tender offer for which the support of the subsidiary’s board of directors had not been 
obtained — the governing legal principles remained somewhat uncertain during most of the 
period under review.   
 
 On the other hand, for most of that same period it seemed clear that if a controlling 
shareholder decided to effect a squeeze out by means of a short-form merger (whether as the sole 
step in the squeeze out, if it owned more than 90 percent of the target, or as a second step 
following a first-step tender offer), then the controlling shareholder had a fiduciary obligation to 
prove that the short-form merger was entirely fair.  Only late in 2001, in Glassman v.  Unocal 
Exploration,62 did the Delaware Supreme Court reverse itself and hold that a controlling 
shareholder had no obligation to prove that a short-form merger was entirely fair.63 
Consequently, as concerned almost all the squeeze outs included in our study, the operative 
planning assumption was that, at some stage in the process, entire fairness would be the relevant 
standard of review.64
 
 As Professor Rock has pointed out, Weinberger and other Delaware cases decided prior 
to 1990 also provided “substantial guidance on how to structure a management buyout 
 
    59 Kahn also confirmed that “entire fairness” was the standard in relation to which that price 
would be reviewed. 
    60 672 A.2d 35 (1995). 
    61 Id. at 40. The rationale for this distinction is that while a controlling shareholder has the power 
to compel its controlled subsidiary to participate in a merger, it does not have the power to compel 
the subsidiary’s public shareholders to accept a tender offer. 
    62 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). 
    63 After Glassman, unless full disclosure has not been made, appraisal is the only remedy 
available to a minority shareholder dissatisfied with the terms of a short-form merger. 
    64 Indeed, the short-form merger in Glassman was negotiated by a SNC appointed by the Unocal 
Exploration board. 
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transaction.”65 As when a squeeze out is proposed, the board of the target company should 
appoint a SNC composed of independent directors, which should then retain its own investment 
bankers and legal counsel and enter into negotiations with the MBO group.   
 
 However, at this point in the process, the responsibilities of a SNC will differ somewhat 
from those of a SNC appointed to negotiate a squeeze out.  Almost every MBO also involves a 
sale of control.66 Thus, a SNC charged with negotiating an MBO must keep in mind its duties 
under Revlon. This both complicates and simplifies the SNC’s task. On one hand, the SNC 
cannot limit its efforts to negotiating with the management group. It also must test the market, in 
some reasonable fashion, to determine whether the management group’s offer represents the 
highest value reasonably available.67 Moreover, if a third party expresses interest in acquiring the 
target, the SNC has a duty to provide it with information comparable to that available to the 
MBO group and otherwise to deal with that party in an evenhanded fashion.68
 
 On the other hand, a SNC that meets its obligations under Revlon generally will find it 
easier than a SNC that negotiates a squeeze out to prove that the price it negotiated was fair.69 In 
the setting of an MBO, so long as the SNC proceeded reasonably, the market test itself will 
constitute persuasive evidence that the target’s shareholders are receiving the highest value 
reasonably available — a price that, by definition, also will be deemed to be fair. In the case of a 
squeeze out, however, comparable, market-based evidence will almost never be available 
because, under Delaware law, a controlling shareholder has no obligation to sell her stock.70  
Moreover, a controlling shareholder that is proposing a squeeze out almost always will make 
clear that she has no desire to sell. Consequently, squeeze outs involve greater litigation risks for 
 
    65 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 U.C.L.A. 
L.Rev. 1009. 1062 (1997). 
    66 Indeed, transferring control from public shareholders to private hands is the principal objective 
of most MBOs. 
    67 This may make MBOs somewhat more vulnerable to substantive challenges than squeeze outs. 
Although the standard of review applicable to an MBO is arguably less rigorous, in a squeeze out no 
market check is required because the controlling shareholder has no obligation to sell its stock, even 
if some third party is prepared to pay more for it than the squeeze out price. [cite] 
    68 Id. Of course, the SNC can limit access to proprietary information those prospective bidders 
that are prepared to sign appropriate confidentiality agreements. 
    69 This conclusion does not turn on any distinction between a price that is “fair” and one that is 
“entirely fair.” In our view, that is a distinction without a difference. 
    70 Bershad v. Curtiss–Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del.1987) (holding that “a stockholder is 
under no duty to sell its holdings in a corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely 
because the sale would profit the minority”). 
  
 
 18
                        
defendants.  No matter how effectively a SNC has done its job, the question of whether the price 
it negotiated is fair ultimately must be resolved on the basis of the (inevitably competing) 
opinions of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts.71 That is a battle that defendants sometimes will 
lose.72
 
 Despite these differences, Delaware law promotes a similar transactional dynamic with 
respect to both squeeze outs and MBOs. In both situations, it effectively discourages the 
potential acquiror from initially placing its best offer on the table. Both a controlling shareholder 
and an MBO group will anticipate that the target company’s board will appoint a SNC.  Both 
will also know that, whether the SNC actually bargains vigorously on behalf of the public 
shareholders or only goes through the motions, evidence that the SNC succeeded in negotiating a 
higher price will make it much more likely that a court will find that the SNC met its fiduciary 
obligations, and that the price to which it agreed was entirely fair. Consequently, the price 
agreed to by SNCs in most (if not all) squeeze outs and MBOs will be higher than the price 
initially offered, regardless of whether any given SNC was an effective advocate for the interests 
of the target’s public shareholders.73
 
 Plaintiffs’ attorneys, we anticipated, would be familiar with this transactional dynamic, 
and would realize that it provides them with strong incentives to file class actions challenging 
both squeeze outs and MBOs as soon as they are announced. A “boilerplate” complaint that 
simply recites the structure of the proposed transaction, asserts that it involves a conflict of 
interests, and alleges that the price offered is unfair or inadequate will almost always survive a 
motion to dismiss and will also shift to defendants the burden of proving that the proposed 
merger is entirely fair, in the case of a squeeze out, or that the members of the SNC were 
independent and that they obtained the highest price reasonably available, in the case of an 
MBO. 
 
    71 See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del 1992), commenting, with respect to 
the analogous issue of valuation in appraisal proceedings, that “a recurring theme [is] the clash of 
contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions on value” and that the Chancery Court “is often 
forced to pick and choose from a limited record without the benefit of objective analysis and 
opinion.” Id. at 1222. 
    72 See, e.g., Wien v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166 (Del. 1991) (finding no unfair 
dealing but holding, based on testimony of plaintiffs’ expert, that fair value of stock acquired was 
$7.27 per share, not $6.00 paid by controlling shareholder). 
    73 A recurrent problem in connection with squeeze outs and MBOs is that courts find it difficult to 
determine whether a SNC has met its fiduciary obligations. See William T. Allen, Independent 
Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 Bus. Law. 2055 (1990). Then-
Chancellor Allen also pointed out that the key to a SNC’s performance often lies in whether the 
attorneys it has retained have educated committee members as to what those obligations are and how 
they should be met. Id. at 2060-63. 
  
 
 19
                        
 
 Moreover, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ bargaining power would derive from far more than their 
ability to impose litigation costs on defendants. In the case of almost every squeeze out and 
MBO, a plaintiffs’ attorney could anticipate that the price finally agreed to by the SNC would be 
higher than the price originally offered by the controlling shareholder or MBO group. 
Consequently, by supplementing her complaint with a presentation to the SNC of her reasons for 
believing that the target company’s stock is worth more than the price originally offered, a 
plaintiffs’ attorney also could put herself in a position to claim some credit for whatever increase 
in price was then negotiated by the SNC and to demand compensation for her efforts. 
 
 Of course, neither a class action plaintiff nor her attorney has a right to present 
information to a SNC, since the committee, acting on behalf of the board, is charged with the 
management of the corporation.74 Nonetheless, we found that SNCs regularly invite plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to present their arguments regarding valuation before those committees finally decide 
on what terms they will approve a squeeze out or an MBO.75
 
 SNCs may follow this practice because it can yield significant tactical benefits. As 
described in the paragraphs that follow, Delaware law gives plaintiffs’ attorneys strong 
incentives to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) recording their acquiescence in 
whatever deal a SNC has negotiated, so long as (a) that deal involves a price greater than the 
price originally offered and (b) defendants acknowledge in the MOU that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
efforts “contributed” to the price increase. With such a MOU in hand, a SNC can be highly 
confident that any deal to which it has agreed is unlikely to be subject to further challenges.  On 
the other hand, if the SNC did not provide plaintiffs’ attorneys with an opportunity to appear, 
those attorneys would have no incentive to acquiesce in the deal negotiated by the SNC, since by 
doing so they would relinquish their claims without having established a clear basis for claiming 
entitlement to a fee award. Moreover, especially in a case in which a plaintiffs’ attorney 
reasonably could argue that the improved price negotiated by a SNC still was unfair, that 
attorney would have a strong incentive to continue to challenge the merger.  Thus, inviting a 
plaintiffs’ attorney to ‘participate’ in its deliberations may allow a SNC to purchase what might 
be termed ‘litigation insurance’ at relatively modest cost.76 At least from the shareholders’ 
perspective, though, so proceeding poses a real danger. It could be a prelude to an implicitly 
collusive settlement in which plaintiffs’ attorneys, in exchange for defendants’ virtual guaranty 
of a fee award, agree to sign off on merger terms that at least arguably are unfair and that they 
might otherwise be successful in challenging. 
 
    74 DGCL § 141, 8 Del. C. §141. 
75  In every settled case we examined that involved a SNC, plaintiffs’ brief in support of the 
proposed settlement recited that plaintiffs’ attorneys had been invited to present their views to 
the defendant corporation’s SNC. We discuss those settlements in Part III below. 
    76 So long as the attorneys’ fees involved are unlikely to increase significantly the cost of the 
transaction. 
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 Moreover, where a plaintiffs’ attorney indicates that she is prepared to acquiesce in a 
SNC’s pricing decision, defendants typically are prepared to acknowledge in the MOU recording 
her acquiescence that the efforts of plaintiffs’ attorneys contributed to some degree to whatever 
the improvement in price the SNC has negotiated.77 This virtually assures plaintiffs' attorneys of 
a generous fee award.78 Thus, by agreeing to settle for the price negotiated by a SNC, a 
plaintiffs’ attorney can obtain an almost certain, substantial benefit and will incur little in the 
way of costs.79
 
 At the same time, the structure of Delaware law operates to discourage plaintiffs’ 
attorneys from challenging the fairness of any revised transaction to which a SNC has agreed, 
whether or not those attorneys believe a SNC has effectively protected shareholders’ interests.  A 
plaintiffs’ attorney who insists on challenging a price agreed to by a SNC inevitably will incur 
substantial costs without any assurance that she will realize any benefits from her efforts. Unless 
the plaintiffs’ attorney can show that the members of the SNC were not independent, she will 
bear the burden of proving that the improved price to which the SNC agreed nonetheless is 
unfair.80 In virtually every case, the SNC’s decision will be supported by a fairness opinion from 
some prominent investment bank. Thus, to prove unfairness, the plaintiffs’ attorney will face the 
added burden of convincing the court that the investment bank was wrong. At a minimum, a 
plaintiffs’ attorney will have to incur substantial litigation costs to mount such an effort. 
 
    77 Every settlement that we examined in a case where plaintiffs’ attorneys agreed to the fairness of 
an increased price that had been negotiated by a SNC included such an acknowledgement by 
defendants. 
    78 Although Delaware practice precludes plaintiffs’ attorneys from discussing their fees directly 
with defendants at this point in the litigation, all parties will know that a fee request inevitably will 
be made. When defendants acknowledge in an MOU the contribution made by plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
they effectively concede that, under the rule of Tandycrafts, plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to a fee 
award. 
    79 Plaintiffs’ attorneys typically negotiate for the right to conduct confirmatory discovery before 
finally signing off on a settlement. However, we found no cases (nor have we heard of any) in which 
a plaintiffs’ attorney, after conducting such discovery, decided to “walk away” from the deal 
embodied in an MOU. In addition, the time devoted to confirmatory discovery, which tends to 
constitute upwards of 40% of the total time that plaintiffs’ attorneys devote to cases that they settle, 
involves virtually no contingency risk, but reduces substantially the apparent per hour fees that they 
are requesting. 
    80 Although in concept it also would be open to plaintiffs’ attorneys to prove that the SNC had not 
attempted to bargain effectively, as a practical matter we believe that plaintiffs’ attorneys would find 
it difficult to sustain such a claim, especially in the face of evidence that the SNC had succeeded in 
obtaining a higher price for the public shareholders. 
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Moreover, since no MOU will have been signed and defendants therefore will not have 
acknowledged any positive contribution by plaintiffs’ attorneys, if those attorneys cannot 
convince the court that the improved price is unfair, they are likely to receive no compensation 
whatsoever for their litigation efforts.  
 
 As concerns both squeeze outs and MBOs, then, Delaware law provides plaintiffs’ 
attorneys with strong incentives to file class action complaints and to try to advance claims of 
unfairness up to the point at which a SNC agrees to an improved price.81 Thereafter, Delaware 
law discourages plaintiffs’ attorneys from continuing to challenge any improved deal to which a 
SNC has agreed, as the probable costs of continuing to litigate will, in almost all cases, far 
outweigh the probable benefits.82 Consequently, we predicted, plaintiffs’ attorneys would agree 
to settle virtually all class actions challenging squeeze outs and MBOs in connection with which 
an improved price was negotiated by a SNC after suit was filed, largely without regard to 
whether they believed that that price was fair. We also recognized that if we found either that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys had chosen to challenge a substantial portion of the improved deals 
negotiated by SNCs or that plaintiffs’ attorneys were demanding fee awards equal to a 
substantial percentage of the price increases to which SNCs had agreed,83 that would strongly 
suggest that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ litigation decisions were motivated largely by a sense of 
loyalty to the plaintiff class, rather than by concern for their own financial interests.  
 
 We found it considerably more difficult to predict how litigation would proceed where 
class actions were filed challenging mergers involving other alleged conflicts of interest. Often, 
whether an actionable conflict exists itself will not be clear. Thus, a plaintiffs’ attorney is likely 
to find it difficult to predict at the outset whether her claim will be governed by the duty of 
loyalty or the business judgment rule. This uncertainty seemed likely to make merger-related 
class actions alleging other conflicts significantly less common than actions challenging squeeze 
outs and MBOs, where both governing legal principles and customary corporate practices were 
well established. It also seemed that the presence of such uncertainty made it significantly more 
 
    81 As pointed out above, Delaware law also makes it attractive for a SNC to allow plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to “participate” in its deliberations with a view to reaching agreement with plaintiffs’ 
attorneys before the SNC announces its formal approval of the terms of a squeeze out or MBO. 
  82 In Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc.,669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) (“Lynch II”), the 
court affirmed a finding that the squeeze out in which Lynch was acquired was entirely fair even 
though, in Lynch I, it had rejected claims that the SNC appointed by the Lynch board had 
effectively represented shareholders’ interests. The court found no reason to question the 
Chancery Court’s assessment of the conflicting testimony of defendants' and plaintiffs' valuation 
experts. We have not found a single reported decision, subsequent to Lynch II, that involved an 
effort by a class action plaintiff to challenge a valuation decision made by a SNC. 
 
    83 I.e., that plaintiffs’ attorneys were claiming that all or a large portion of such price increases 
were due to their efforts, rather than the efforts of the SNCs. 
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likely that where such other conflicts of interest were alleged, litigation would involve a judicial 
decision addressing the merits of whatever claim plaintiffs’ attorneys had made. 
 
 
 
 III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS  
 
  
 A. Introduction and Hypotheses 
 
 The discussion in Parts I and II yields two broad alternative hypotheses as to what drives 
shareholder litigation in Delaware.  Both start with the neoclassical economic assumption that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are rational economic actors who act primarily with a view to advancing their 
own economic interests.  The first hypothesis is that the structure of Delaware law channels the self-
interest of the attorneys so that they are genuine advocates of shareholders’ best interests; i.e., these 
suits are brought by attorneys who are acting primarily in the interests of shareholders and who 
thereby serve as an effective “police force” to ensure compliance with corporate fiduciary duties.  
This appears to be the vision of the Delaware courts.  The courts acknowledge that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys may instead act in ways that primarily promote their own interests rather than the interests 
of their nominal clients. But, the courts claim, they are prepared to monitor the activities of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, primarily through reviews of settlements and of fee awards, so as to keep those 
attorneys focused on their beneficial role and discourage them from behaving opportunistically.  We 
label this the shareholder champion hypothesis. 
 
 We offer a second hypothesis that, we believe, applies to merger-related class actions:  
Delaware substantive law relating to pleading standards, burdens of proof, and standards of review, 
when overlaid on the system that Delaware courts have  created to encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
initiate and maintain private litigation, provides plaintiffs’ attorneys with  strong incentives to act 
largely in their own interests rather than in the best interests of shareholders, and plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have responded to these incentives in a predictably self-interested fashion. Implicit in this hypothesis 
is the view that courts’ restraint on attorneys’ behavior, through review of settlements and fee 
awards, has been scanty and ineffective in curbing such self-interested behavior.  We label this the 
self-interested litigator hypothesis. 
 
 To some extent, the two hypotheses have similar implications.  Both the beneficial and the 
not-so-beneficial forms of litigation will be drawn to mergers where the pleading grounds are 
stronger, where the transactions are larger (either because of greater potential injuries incurred by 
shareholders, or because of the greater willingness of defendants to pay “modest” fees to settle 
nuisance suits), and where the initial premium offered to target company shareholders is smaller 
(again, either because shareholders may have suffered greater harm, or the plaintiffs’ attorneys may 
simply hope for more sympathy from a judge and thus a greater willingness of defendants to settle).  
But, given the relatively low costs of initial filings, the self-interested litigator hypothesis would 
predict faster and more frequent filings when cases are filed, as well as opportunistic efforts to free 
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ride on the efforts of others (e.g., SNCs and competing bidders) when possible.  Further, the self-
interested litigator hypothesis would predict ready acquiescence in any improvements that SNCs 
achieve, regardless of whether any given SNC was diligent in promoting shareholders’ interests, and 
few post-improvement challenges. 
 
 To test these hypotheses, we initially collected data for the years 1990-2001 with respect to 
mergers where the target company was publicly traded and incorporated in Delaware and the deal 
value was in excess of $100 million.84   Next, we collected information on those stockholder class 
action lawsuits that were filed against a target company following the announcement of a merger.  
The information collected includes the date of the filing of the suit (or of the first complaint if 
multiple complaints were filed), the allegations in the complaint, the legal outcome, the terms of the 
outcome (e.g., the terms of any settlement), the fees (if any) awarded to the plaintiff law firm, and 
other relevant events.  Because of the substantial data collection burden involved in identifying, 
matching, and describing the legal information where suits have been filed, we have restricted our 
analyses to the years 1999-2001. 
 
 We initially examined the characteristics of those mergers (104) that were challenged by 
lawsuits and those (460) that remained unchallenged.  These analyses are discussed in Section B.  
They indicate that the bringing of shareholder class-action lawsuits in Delaware is a systematic 
process – it is clearly not random – and it follows the patterns suggested above.  The results of these 
suit-initiation analyses, however, do not allow us to distinguish between our two broad hypotheses. 
 
 We then examined the patterns of the 104 suits that were actually brought.  In Section C we 
describe broad patterns.  Especially worth noting among these are the high percentage of cases in 
which an initial complaint was brought within two business days and the pattern of multiple filings 
of suits.  In line with Thompson and Thomas, we believe that multiple filings, as well as early filings 
of complaints, suggest opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs’ bar.  In Section D we summarize our 
detailed examination of the pattern of settlements and dismissals against the background of the 
categories of merger.  That pattern, we believe, is broadly supportive of the self-interested litigator 
hypothesis.  In Section E we discuss the five (of the 104) cases where “real” clients, with substantial 
financial interests, were represented by attorneys from outside the “traditional” Delaware plaintiffs’ 
bar. The differences in the ways that these five cases were pursued, as compared with the pattern 
described by the remaining (99) cases that were litigated by members of the traditional plaintiffs’ 
bar, are again supportive of the self-interested litigator hypothesis.  In section F we evaluate how 
effectively the Delaware courts have monitored settlements and fee awards in the cases brought by 
traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys and find that the courts have not been effective monitors. Finally, in 
Section G we provide a summary and evaluation of these empirical results and their implications. 
 
 B. The Influences on Legal Challenges to Mergers 
 
 The Thomson database yielded 564 mergers for the years 1999-2001 where the target 
                         
    84 The source of these data is the Thomson Securities Data Corp. (SDC). 
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company was a publicly traded Delaware company and where the value of the transaction exceeded 
$100 million.85  Of these 564 mergers, 104 were challenged.  We initially asked whether the pattern 
of challenges was systematic – whether there were features of these mergers that tended to increase 
the likelihood that a merger would be challenged.  Equivalently, these features would be influences 
on the incentives of plaintiffs’ lawyers to initiate and maintain shareholder class-action lawsuits. 
 
 Following the discussion above, we focused on four potential features of mergers that might 
influence the likelihood that the merger would be challenged:  First, all-cash mergers, as sale-of-
control transactions, would be more likely to attract stockholder class action lawsuits than would 
mergers where the acquiror offers stock to the target company's shareholders.  Second, lawsuits 
should be more likely where the transactions86 are larger (which could indicate greater potential 
injury to shareholders and, in any event, would increase the likely size of recoveries/settlements87).  
Third, suits should be more likely where the share price offered by the acquiror (as compared to the 
pre-offer market price) represents a relatively small premium (and thus, again, shareholders may 
face greater injury, and plaintiffs’ attorneys may find a more sympathetic judicial ear).  Fourth, the 
findings of Thompson and Thomas88 indicate that self-dealing abuses are also likely to trigger 
lawsuits.  Two likely indicators of self-dealing would be (a) whether the acquiror owned a stake in 
the target company (and thus might influence the target's senior management and board of directors 
to accept an unduly low offer price); and (b) whether the senior management (and/or board) have 
come to a prior understanding with the acquiror as to post-acquisition positions and/or remuneration 
(and, thus, might be unduly prone to accept this acquiror’s offer and reluctant to seek better terms for 
public shareholders – perhaps by “shopping” the company around to other potential acquirors -- for 
fear of souring a deal with this acquiror).89
 
    85 Where the Thomson database included transactions that involved a company that was 
emerging from bankruptcy, a corporate spinoff of a subsidiary to the company’s shareholders, or 
some other unsuitable transaction, we excluded such observations from our sample. 
 
    86 The size of the transaction itself – the amount paid by the acquiror – or the size of the target 
(we employ four candidate size variables) may be the appropriate indicators here.  Preliminary 
analysis indicated that the broad industry category of the target (as represented by the one-digit 
SIC code) – e.g., identifying whether the target was primarily engaged in manufacturing, 
retailing, financial services, etc. – was never significant as an indicator of the tendency to bring 
lawsuits, and hence this set of variables was dropped from further analysis. 
 
    87 To paraphrase bank robber Willie Sutton, larger transactions are where the money is. 
 
    88 Thompson & Thomas, supra note XX. 
    89 Though the characteristics of acquirors might also influence the likelihood of a lawsuit’s 
being brought, characterizations of acquirors are not easily developed from the data, since many 
acquirors are not publicly traded companies and thus information about them are often not 
available.  One characteristic that is available –whether the acquiror was a foreign-headquartered 
company – was included in initial analyses, but this variable yielded little explanatory power and 
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 As our discussion above90 indicates, we recognize that these variables have dual 
interpretations:  They could support either the shareholder champion hypothesis or the self-interested 
litigator hypothesis.  Consequently, they will not allow us to differentiate between the two.  
Nevertheless, they give us a first look at whether the overall pattern of litigation is purposive and 
systematic, or whether it is largely random and inexplicable. 
   
 1. Differences in means and medians 
 
 The available data for 1999-2001 are arrayed in Table 1, according to whether a merger 
announcement was shortly followed by one or more class action lawsuits or whether the transaction 
was unchallenged; the data for the individual years are arrayed in Tables 2-4.  In addition, the means 
of the variables – for the mergers that attracted lawsuits, and the mergers that did not – are portrayed 
graphically in Figures 1-8. 
 
 We begin by describing the overall sample.  As can be seen in Table 1, there were 564 
qualifying91 mergers over the years 1999-2001, of which 104 (18.4%) were followed by at least one 
stockholder class action lawsuit and 460 (81.6%) were unchallenged.  The mergers that attracted 
lawsuits tended to be larger, as predicted.92  This is true for measurements involving the mean as 
well as the median, and for size measured by value of the deal,93 the target's annual sales, the target's 
net income, the target's total assets, and the target's value of common equity.94  The offer-price 
premium95 was smaller for the mergers that attracted lawsuits than for the mergers that did not, as 
 
was dropped from subsequent analyses.  Also, a “hostile” tender offer should be less likely to 
attract lawsuits; however, the Thomson database does not distinguish between “hostile” and 
“friendly” tender offers, so this potential variable could not be employed. 
 
    90 In Section A, supra. 
 
   91 As explained above, "qualifying" means that the merger target was a publicly traded company 
that was incorporated in Delaware, and that the deal value exceeded $100 million. 
92 As we discussed in text at note XX supra, larger transactions are more likely to yield larger 
recoveries/settlements.  
    93 This result supports our early decision to focus our attention on those transactions where the 
deal value exceeded $100 million. 
 
    94 Because the assets of financial institutions (SIC 6) tend to be larger than those of non-financial 
firms, and also financial institutions' "revenues" may not be comparable to non-financial firms' 
"sales", in our preliminary analysis we also computed means and medians for only the non-financial 
firms in our sample (i.e., with the financial institutions excluded).  The same patterns described in 
the text continued to hold. 
    95 Premiums are calculated as the percentage difference between the acquiror's initial offer per 
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predicted. 
 
 The mergers that attracted lawsuits were more likely to be all-cash deals, as predicted.  
Almost two-thirds of the lawsuits (67 out of 104, or 64.4%) followed all-cash deals, whereas less 
than a third (131 of 460, or 28.5%) of the lawsuit-free deals were all cash.96
 
 Stockholder class action lawsuits also tended to occur in mergers where the acquiror had a 
prior ownership stake in the target company or there were appearances of self-dealing, as 
predicted.97  Almost two-thirds of the lawsuits (68 out of 104, or 65.4%) followed mergers where the 
acquiror already had an ownership stake in the target company or there was self-dealing, whereas 
less than 5% (21 out of 460, or 4.6%) of the lawsuit-free mergers involved such circumstances. 
 
 When the means and medians for the individual years 1999, 2000, and 2001 are examined, 
similar patterns emerge with respect to all of these variables, although the levels of statistical 
significance are more varied. 
 
 2. Regression analysis 
 
 Though differences in means and medians provide a useful "first cut" at the data, these 
univariate comparisons do not allow for covariation and multivariate analysis.  Accordingly, we now 
turn to multivariate (logit) regression analysis.98
 
 
share and the closing market price on the trading day immediately before the announcement day, as 
provided in the SDC database.  The SDC database also calculates the premium, based on closing 
prices a week before the announcement and four weeks before the announcement.  The results are 
quite similar to the day-before data that we present. 
    96 An alternative way of portraying the data yields the same conclusion: Of the 198 all-cash 
transactions, 67 (33.8%) attracted class action lawsuits; of the remaining 366 transactions, only 37 
(10.1%) attracted such lawsuits. 
    97 Because we have not investigated in detail the terms of every merger where a lawsuit was 
not initiated, it is possible that there were some instances among these lawsuit-free mergers 
where the target company’s senior managers and/or directors also received remunerative 
promises (and thus our tabulation of such instances may be undercounted).  Nevertheless, the 
differences that we find are so large and striking that we consider it unlikely that any 
undercounting would change the significance of our results. 
 
    98 Logit regression analysis is a standard method of analyzing data where the dependent 
variable is a 1,0 dichotomous variable.  Further discussions of logit analysis can be found in 
most standard econometrics texts. See, e.g., William H. Greene, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, 
5th edn. (2003). 
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 In Table 5 we show the results of logit regressions for the combined years 1999-2001, and in 
Tables 6-8 we show the results for each year separately.  The dependent variable is a 1,0 lawsuit 
variable (a merger where one or more lawsuits were filed = 1; a merger where no lawsuit was filed = 
0), and a variety of the characteristics of the mergers are the independent (explanatory) variables. 
 
 As can be seen in Table 5, for the combined years the most powerful explanatory variable is 
whether the acquiror had a prior ownership stake in the target company (or there were other 
appearances of prior self-dealing).  A variable that is related to the size of the deal or the size of the 
target company (whether in natural numbers or in logarithms) is also generally (but not always) 
significant.99  Further, an all-cash deal tended to attract lawsuits, as did the payment of a lower 
premium paid for the target’s shares; both variables are consistently significant. 
 
 The results for the individual years, shown in Tables 6-8, reinforce the impression that an 
acquiror’s prior stake and the size of the transaction tended to be the powerful influences on whether 
a lawsuit was initiated.  The other variables’ influences are more spotty (in terms of statistical 
significance), although the plus and minus signs of the coefficients (and thus the predicted direction 
of effects in terms of encouraging or discouraging lawsuits) are consistent. 
 
 3. A summing up 
 
 The data on means/medians and the logit regression analyses yield consistent inferences:  A 
prior ownership stake or other appearances of conflicts, a larger size of the transaction or of the 
target, the presence of an all-cash transaction, and a lower initial premium offered to the target’s 
shareholders all influenced significantly the likelihood that a merger would be challenged with one 
or more shareholder class-action lawsuits.  Although these results do not allow us to distinguish 
between our two broad hypotheses, they do indicate that the initiation of these lawsuits was 
systematic in sensible ways and was far from random. 
 
 C. A Brief Summary of the Lawsuits 
 
 As described above, there were 104 mergers that attracted at least one class action lawsuit.  
Of these suits, 48 settled, 54 were dismissed, and 2 are still pending as of this writing.  Of the 
settlements, 31 involved claimed monetary recoveries for the plaintiffs, and 17 involved only non-
monetary terms. These outcomes are described graphically in Figure 9.  We will first describe some 
of the characteristics of the overall sample of the 104 cases and then of the 48 settlements and 54 
dismissals. 
 
 1. Speed of filing 
 
 An immediately striking fact is the speed with which these complaints were filed: Of the 104 
 
    99 A high degree of correlation among the size variables creates statistical problems of 
multicolinearity if more than one such variable is included in the regressions. 
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challenged mergers, 77 (74.0%) attracted their initial lawsuit within one business day of the merger 
announcement.  An additional 7 mergers (6.7%) attracted their initial lawsuit on the second business 
day after the merger announcement.  Thus, for the mergers that did attract lawsuits, over 80% of the 
time the initial complaint was filed within two business days of the merger announcement.100 
 
  As do Thompson and Thomas,101 we believe that such rapid/early filings of complaints 
suggest opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs’ bar. 
 
 2. Numbers of complaints filed 
 
 For these 104 challenged mergers, multiple suits filed by a law firm that is a member of the 
“traditional” Delaware plaintiffs’ bar were the norm.  The mean number of suits per challenged 
merger was 5.7, the median was 5, and only 12 challenged mergers (11.7%) were the subject of only 
a single complaint. 
 
 Again following Thompson and Thomas, we believe that multiple complaints suggest 
opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs’ bar. 
 
 3. Settled and dismissed cases 
 
 The outcomes of the lawsuits were close to evenly split between settlements (48, or 47.1% of 
the 102 cases with known outcomes102) and dismissals (54, or 52.9% of 102).  None of the cases 
were litigated to a judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs.  However, a second striking fact 
emerges from a detailed examination of the dismissals:  Of the 54 dismissed cases, 51 (94.4% of the 
54 dismissals) were dropped before there was a judicial decision that addressed the merits of the 
lawsuit; only three of the dismissals followed an adverse judicial decision addressing the merits.  
Moreover, very few of the 51 cases that plaintiffs’ attorneys dismissed voluntarily involved 
significant litigation efforts by plaintiffs following the filing of a complaint or, in most instances, 
multiple complaints.  This further suggests to us that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decisions concerning 
when to file and whether a case warranted active prosecution probably were governed more by those 
attorneys’ economic self-interest than by client-oriented processes and thus provides support for the 
self-interested litigator hypothesis. 
                         
100 Such rapid filings indicate that plaintiffs’ attorneys spent little or no time doing research or 
consulting with their ’clients’ before filing complaints.  By contrast, in our analysis (in Section E 
infra) of the five lawsuits prosecuted by law firms that are not part of the ‘traditional plaintiffs’ 
bar’ and that represented ‘real’ clients with substantial financial stakes, we find that none of the 
five complaints were filed within the first or second day; the earliest complaint (of the five) was 
filed six days after the merger announcement, the latest was filed thirteen days after the 
announcement, and the median interval was nine days. 
    101 Thompson & Thomas, supra note X. 
 
    102 This number excludes two cases that, as of this writing, are still ongoing. 
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 For the 48 challenged mergers where there were settlements, in 43 instances (89.6%) the first 
complaint was filed within two business days of the merger announcement.  In these cases, the mean 
number of complaints filed was 7.3, and there were only 3 cases (6.2%) in which only a single 
complaint was filed. 
 
 For the 54 challenged mergers where all of the suits were eventually dismissed, in 41 
instances (75.9%) the first complaint was filed within two business days of the announcement.  In 
these cases, the mean number of complaints filed was 4.4, and there were 9 cases (16.7%) in which 
only a single complaint was filed. 
 
 4. Monetary recoveries 
  
 Of the 48 settlements, in almost two-thirds (31, or 64.6%) the plaintiffs’ attorneys claimed to 
have achieved or contributed to monetary recoveries for the class, in terms of improvements in the 
payments that the target’s shareholders had received or would receive.  These claimed recoveries 
averaged $163 million, but ranged from a low of $3 million to a high of $1,250 million, with a 
median of $50 million.  The size of the claimed recovery was positively and significantly related to 
the announced value of the transaction and to the various size measures of the target; but after the 
value of the transaction was controlled for, no other variable played a significant role in explaining 
the size of the recovery.  When expressed as the percentage improvement in the price received by 
the target shareholders, these monetary recoveries yielded a 15.6% price improvement, with a range 
of 0.8% to 50.0% and a median of 12.6%.  However, consistent with the self-interested litigator 
hypothesis, we found that plaintiffs’ attorneys frequently were able to free ride on the improved 
terms negotiated by SNCs or on the price improvements that resulted from competing bids, that they 
rarely claimed a major share of the credit for the improvements, and that they never persisted in 
challenging the terms negotiated by a SNC or the terms proposed by a competing bidder.103
 
 5. Legal fees 
 
 For the 48 cases that settled, information on the legal fees received by plaintiffs’ attorneys 
was generally available.  We portray this information in Figure 9.  As can be seen, the aggregate fees 
received, as well as the hourly rates, were far higher for the settlements where monetary recoveries 
were claimed than for the settlements where only non-monetary terms were achieved. When viewed 
on an hourly-rate basis, the fees also seem rather high, especially when one takes into account the 
fact that we computed hourly rates on the basis of every lawyer-hour worked, without distinguishing 
between senior partners and junior associates, and in some cases also included hours worked by 
paralegals. For settlements that involved no monetary recovery, legal fees averaged $492 an hour 
and the median fee award was equal to $472 an hour. For settlements that involved a monetary 
recovery, the average fee awarded was equal to $1,800 per hour for every attorney-hour worked and 
the median was $1,240 per hour. Moreover, our examination of all merger-related class actions filed 
 
     103 See the discussion in Sec. D below. 
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in 1999-2001 suggests that the attorneys who brought these cases did not face much in the way of 
contingency risk.104 Thus, our results suggest that litigating merger-related class actions in Delaware 
Chancery Court appears to be a lucrative area of practice for the plaintiffs’ bar. 
 
 We attempted to explain the pattern of legal fees received, where, alternatively, the 
aggregate fee per case and the hourly rate were the dependent variables.  Preliminary analysis 
indicated that, for those settlements where there were claimed monetary recoveries, the aggregate fee 
and the hourly rate were only mildly (and insignificantly) positively related to the claimed size of the 
monetary recovery.105  We therefore excluded this variable from further analysis, which thereby 
allowed us to expand our sample to include those cases where there were only non-monetary 
recoveries. 
 
 A formal regression model (using ordinary least squares) was employed to explain the levels, 
alternatively, of the aggregate fee per case and the hourly rates awarded.  The values of fees, target 
assets, and deal were expressed in terms of natural logarithms for the purposes of these regressions.  
These results are found in Table 9.  As can be seen, a settlement that involved only non-monetary 
relief yielded lower aggregate fees and lower hourly fees, consistent with the pattern found in Figure 
9.  In addition, aggregate fees and hourly fees tended to be higher where the target was larger (as 
measured by the target’s assets) or where the deal value was larger.  Finally, the hourly fees tended 
to be lower in settlements where there was a court-ordered reduction in fees (which is discussed at 
greater length in Section F below), as expected, but the effect of this influence is not statistically 
significant. 
 
 Two other features of these legal fees are worth noting:  First, the average size of the 
aggregate fees per case as a percentage of the claimed monetary recoveries achieved for the 31 
settlements where there were such recoveries claimed was 4.6%, but the range was 0.01% to 29.6%, 
and the median was 1.9%.  There was a significant negative correlation between the fee percentage 
and the size of claimed monetary recoveries.  Second, the average size of the aggregate fees per case 
as a percentage of the deal value was 0.19%, with a range of 0.005% to 1.36% and a median of 
 
    104 As described in more detail in section D, very few cases in which plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged 
in substantial litigation activity were dismissed. Most cases that did not result in settlements seem to 
have been abandoned by the lawyers who filed them shortly after they were filed. We recognize 
that, as a formal matter, plaintiffs’ attorneys could not “abandon” these cases without court 
approval. However, we found no case in which the court denied, or even appeared to question, a 
motion by plaintiffs’ attorneys to dismiss without prejudice. 
 
    105 The results with respect to the aggregate fee and the recovery are sharply different from the 
results found by Eisenberg and Miller.  They found, for a broader sample of class action 
lawsuits, that the aggregate fee per case was strongly related to the client recovery in the case.  
See Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An 
Empirical Study, 1 J. Empir. L. Stud. 27 (2004). One possible cause of the disparity may be that 
Eisenberg and Miller based their study on reported decisions, while most of the settlements 
included in our study involve unreported decisions. 
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0.12%. Thus, while plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have been well compensated, the attorneys' fees 
that they received increased by only a relatively trivial amount the total cost of these transactions to 
the acquiring corporations. 
  
 D. A More Detailed Analysis of Settled and Dismissed Cases 
 
 In an initial effort to describe the pattern of settlements and dismissals – i.e., to try to explain 
or predict which suits were likely to settle and which were likely to be dismissed, based on the 
characteristics of the challenged mergers in each category -- we employed similar statistical analyses 
to those described above: examinations of means and medians of the merger characteristics, and 
logit regressions.  However, there were no significant differences between the characteristics of 
those challenged mergers where the lawsuits settled and those where the suit was dismissed. 
 
 We also conducted a more qualitative analysis of the pattern of settlements and dismissals 
against the backdrop of our predictions (in Part II) concerning the probability and probable course of 
litigation relating to the various categories of merger. 
 
 To set the stage for this analysis, we provide below a somewhat more detailed and nuanced 
summary of the legal outcomes of the 104 instances in which mergers were challenged: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999-2001 Challenged Mergers – Summary (104 cases total) 
1. Mergers involving a conflict of interests – 62 cases filed (60%)
 a. Mergers involving a controlling shareholder – 31 cases filed (50%)
  i. Settled/Mooted, fee paid – 23 cases (74%) 
   (a) Monetary recovery – 18 cases (78%) 
   (b) No monetary recovery – 5 cases (22%) 
  ii. Dismissed without prejudice – 8 cases (26%) 
 b. Mergers involving other conflicts of interest – 31 cases filed (50%)  
  i. Settled/Mooted, fee paid – 12 cases (39%) 
   (a) Monetary recovery – 7 cases (58%) 
   (b) No monetary recovery – 5 cases (42%) 
  ii. Dismissed without prejudice – 17 cases (55%) 
  iii. Still pending – 2 cases (6%) 
2. Mergers not involving a conflict of interests – 39 cases filed (38%)
 a. Mergers clearly involving a sale of control – 12 cases filed (31%)
  i. Settled/Mooted, fee paid – 6 cases (50%)  
   (a) Monetary recovery – no cases  
   (b) No monetary recovery – 6 cases (100%) 
  ii. Dismissed without prejudice – 6 cases (50%) 
 b. Mergers arguably involving a sale of control – 3 cases filed (8%)
  i. Settled/Mooted, fee paid – 1 case (33%)  
   (a) Monetary recovery – no cases 
   (b) No monetary recovery – 1 case (100%) 
  ii. Dismissed without prejudice – 2 cases (67%) 
 c. Mergers involving defensive tactics – 12 cases filed (31%)
  i. Settled/Mooted, fee paid – 4 cases (33%)  
   (a) Monetary recovery – 4 cases (100%) 
   (b) No monetary recovery – no case  
  ii. Dismissed without prejudice – 8 cases (67%) 
 d. Mergers not involving a sale of control or defensive tactics – 12 cases filed (31%)
  i. Settled/Mooted, fee paid – 2 cases (17%)  
   (a) Monetary recovery – 2 cases (100%) 
   (b) No monetary recovery – no cases  
  ii. Dismissed without prejudice – 10 cases (83%) 
3. Tender offers by a controlling shareholder – 3 cases filed (3%)
  i. Settled/Mooted, fee paid – no cases   
   (a) Monetary recovery – no cases 
   (b) No monetary recovery – no cases 
  ii. Dismissed without prejudice – 3 cases (100%) 
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 We will follow this organizational scheme in the discussion that follows.106
 
1. Mergers involving a conflict of interests 
 
 a. Mergers involving a controlling shareholder.  Our prediction was that the typical pattern 
of such cases would be that the controlling shareholder would make an offer to squeeze out the 
public shareholders at a price lower than the highest price it was prepared to pay. A class action 
would be filed challenging the fairness of the proposed transaction. The controlled corporation 
would create a SNC, which would retain its own financial and legal advisors, provide plaintiffs' 
attorneys with an opportunity to make some sort of presentation in support of their view that the 
initial offer was unfair, and negotiate a higher price with the controlling shareholder. Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys would acquiesce in the price agreed to by the SNC in an MOU in which defendants 
would acknowledge that plaintiffs’ efforts contributed in some fashion to whatever increase in 
price the SNC had negotiated. Plaintiffs would also obtain the right to take confirmatory 
discovery and, perhaps, to comment on the proxy statement or tender offer documents that would 
be used to effect the squeeze out. Following such discovery, plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants 
would sign a formal Stipulation of Settlement, in which defendants would agree to pay plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees and expenses, up to some agreed upon amount that would represent no more than 
a very modest percentage of the price increase (and a considerably more modest percentage of 
the value of the transaction), if awarded by the court.  
 
 The results of these cases were largely consistent with this prediction. All 31 cases 
involving challenges to squeeze outs were filed by members of the plaintiffs’ bar. Of the 18 
cases settled for a monetary recovery, 17 followed the above-described pattern very closely.  
 
The only settled case that did not was a challenge to Citicorp’s acquisition of the 15% of 
the stock of Travelers Property Casualty Corp. that it did not own.107  When Citicorp announced 
its initial offer of $41.50 cash per share, it also announced that the offer had been approved by a 
SNC of the Travelers board. This structuring of the merger effectively denied plaintiffs’ 
attorneys any opportunity to free ride on the efforts of the SNC. However, 11 class action 
complaints were filed challenging the fairness of the merger and alleging that the SNC was a 
sham. Moreover, in contrast to the other 17 cases in this category, in none of which did 
plaintiffs’ attorneys pursue a challenge to the independence of the SNC, here plaintiffs’ attorneys 
filed a Second Amended Complaint alleging that the Form 14D-9 filed by Travelers withheld 
and obscured material facts regarding the independence of the Chairman of the SNC and the 
fairness analysis prepared by Morgan Stanley for the SNC. Here alone plaintiffs’ attorneys also 
sought expedited discovery and a preliminary injunction. That precipitated settlement 
 
    106 A listing of the 104 cases that are the basis for this discussion is available from the authors 
upon request. Most cases clearly fit into one of the designated categories, but a few required 
judgments on our part. Assigning those cases to other, arguably more appropriate categories 
would not significantly change the analysis that follows. 
 
    107 Travelers Property Casualty Corp., C.A. 17902 (Mar. 21, 2000). 
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discussions resulting in an agreement that Citicorp would increase its offer to $41.95 cash per 
share, which increased by $25.7 million the amount to be received by the plaintiff class.  
 
In essence, when the plaintiffs’ attorneys who challenged the Citicorp-Travelers merger 
could not free ride (because the Travelers’ SNC had blessed Citicorp’s bid before it was 
announced), they were prepared to engage in significant litigation efforts to challenge the SNC’s 
decision. They then acted like true shareholder champions rather than merely self-interested 
litigators. That this was the only squeeze out case involving a monetary settlement in which 
plaintiffs’ attorneys mounted such a challenge fueled our suspicions that in the other such cases, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decisions to settle, rather than to challenge the improved prices negotiated 
by SNCs, may well have reflected their rational responses to the incentives provided by 
Delaware law, and not necessarily (or entirely) their good faith judgments that the terms of those 
mergers were ‘entirely fair.’ 
 
 None of the five settlements that involved only a non-monetary remedy followed the 
transaction/litigation pattern that we suggested would likely yield a monetary recovery.  
Consequently, they are not inconsistent with our self-interested litigator hypothesis.  In three of the 
cases, the plaintiffs challenged the procedures that the defendants had followed in effecting the 
merger, and in the remaining two a SNC had already been formed and had approved the merger 
price before the merger was announced.  In four of the five cases, the plaintiffs settled for additional 
disclosures.108
 
 There were eight cases in which challenges to squeeze outs were filed and then voluntarily 
dismissed without significant litigation by plaintiffs’ attorneys.  In three cases, the proposed 
transaction fell apart.  In a fourth case, a SNC had already formed and approved the merger price 
prior to the merger announcement, and in a fifth the defendants simply moved to dismiss and the 
plaintiffs failed to respond.  There were three cases where a SNC was appointed and negotiated an 
improved price for shareholders, but where the plaintiffs’ attorneys did not, or were somehow unable 
to, free ride on the price improvements achieved by the SNCs.   Neither the litigation documents nor 
press reports provide facts that explain these outcomes, but one possible explanation is that the 
SNCs in these cases may not have given the plaintiffs’ attorneys any opportunity to participate in 
their deliberations and thus may have denied them any clear basis to claim credit for the 
improvements in price. In any event, the fact that these SNCs negotiated improvements in the 
absence of active litigation provides some support for the argument that some (and perhaps most) 
SNCs are prepared to represent public shareholders’ interests adequately without plaintiffs’ 
attorneys looking over their shoulders. 
 
 b. Mergers involving other conflicts of interest.  Our prediction in cases involving MBOs 
was very similar to that concerning squeeze outs. We also stated that it was more difficult to 
 
    108 In the remaining case, In re PepsiAmericas Corp. Shareholder Litigation, C.A.  18280 
(Aug. 31, 2000), the plaintiffs settled for a promise that there would be no downward adjustment 
in the merger price. 
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predict the pattern or outcomes of cases involving other conflicts of interest, other than that it 
seemed more likely that those cases would involve judicial decisions addressing the merits of 
plaintiffs’ claims concerning the existence of a conflict of interests.  
 
 Especially if we exclude the three settlements involving monetary recoveries that were 
not prosecuted by members of the traditional plaintiffs’ bar, our results differ significantly from 
our predictions. Only a small proportion of the cases prosecuted (or dismissed) by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys resulted in monetary recoveries — 4 of 28, or 14% — and a much higher proportion of 
those cases, 61%, were voluntarily dismissed. The disparity, we believe, can be explained largely 
by the fact that we anticipated that the transactional pattern of MBOs would be much the same as 
that of squeeze out mergers,109 but we found that not to have been the case. When a controlling 
shareholder proposes a squeeze out, it often will have no good reason to keep its bid a secret, 
since it has no duty to sell its shares and therefore no competing bid will be made. However, 
when a MBO is proposed, or when a board is considering strategic alternatives that may include 
a MBO, there may be good reason to believe that the highest value reasonably available can be 
obtained through private negotiations, rather than through a public “auction.” We inferred that 
this often was the case in the period under study because a substantial proportion of the MBOs 
that we reviewed were publicly announced only after a SNC had tested the market and then 
agreed on terms with the MBO group. Although a plaintiffs’ attorney still could challenge such a 
merger by alleging disclosure violations, a class action challenging the MBO price would be 
much less attractive because no increase in price above the price already negotiated by the SNC 
was likely, which would rule out the possibility of free riding on the efforts of the SNC. In 
addition, in MBO cases (as opposed to squeeze outs), a SNC often would find it relatively easy 
to prove that the price that it had negotiated was fair; it could point to its efforts to test the 
market to show that the price it had negotiated represented the highest value reasonably available 
for the target corporation’s stock.110
 
 Of the seven settled cases involving monetary recoveries, four were prosecuted by 
traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys, and three were prosecuted by attorneys who represented 
plaintiffs with substantial financial stakes in the litigation. All of the four that were prosecuted 
by traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys involved MBOs or mergers with similar characteristics. In 
three of them, consistent with our predictions, SNCs negotiated increased offers after the MBOs 
were announced and in all three plaintiffs’ attorneys acquiesced in those offers. In the fourth, 
Seagate Technology,111 plaintiffs’ attorneys obtained an order certifying the action as a class 
 
    109 Based, in large part, on Professor Rock’s description of the transactional pattern typical of 
MBOs. See Rock, cited in note __ (stating that typically a MBO group will announce a bid and 
that the target’s board then will create a SNC to test the market and negotiate with the MBO 
group). 
 
     110 See text at notes __-__, supra. 
 
     111 In re Seagate Technology, Inc. Shareholder Litig., C.A. 17932 (Mar. 30, 2000). 
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action, conducted extensive document discovery, took depositions and moved for an expedited 
hearing on their motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants then agreed to modify the terms 
of a somewhat complex MBO agreement, thereby providing $112.5 million to $200 million in 
additional value to the plaintiff class.  In essence, as was true for Travelers (discussed above), 
where the plaintiffs’ attorneys decided it was worth their while to invest in significant litigation 
activity, they were able to generate significant benefits for the plaintiff class. We find it 
noteworthy, though, that Seagate and Travelers are the only two cases in which traditional 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ efforts clearly were responsible for producing significant monetary benefits 
for the plaintiff class.  It also is noteworthy that in both cases the attorneys fees awarded were 
appreciably above the average – about 10% of the benefit produced in Seagate and 17% in 
Travelers.112 
 
 We will discuss the three cases that were prosecuted by attorneys representing plaintiffs 
with substantial stakes in Section E below. 
 
 Of the five cases that were settled for non-monetary relief, three involved MBOs in 
which the price had been negotiated by a SNC before the merger was announced and there was 
no subsequent increase in price. A fourth involved a MBO in which the price was subsequently 
increased but where defendants did not credit plaintiffs for contributing to the increase. These 
four were settled for additional disclosures, revisions of deal protection terms, or various other 
forms of non-monetary relief. In the fifth case, Captec Net Lease Realty,113 plaintiffs challenged 
the fairness of a side deal involving the sale of certain assets to the target’s CEO. After the court 
granted plaintiffs’ motion for expedited discovery, which suggests that it thought plaintiffs’ 
claims had some merit, the parties settled for supplemental disclosure and payment by 
defendants of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses. 
 
 Of the 17 cases that were voluntarily dismissed, 13 involved MBOs. In 12 of those, the 
terms of the merger had been negotiated by a SNC (or the target’s full board in one case) prior to 
public announcement of the proposed merger. In the other, Authentic Fitness,114 the target’s SNC 
negotiated a modest increase in price that plaintiffs’ attorneys then challenged in an amended 
complaint. However, when defendants moved to dismiss, plaintiffs’ attorneys did not file a 
response. They subsequently moved to dismiss without prejudice. In White Cap Industries,115 
one of the 12, plaintiffs’ attorneys also filed an amended complaint challenging the 
independence of the members of the SNC and the fairness of the price. However, as in Authentic 
Fitness, when defendants filed and briefed a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ attorneys did not 
respond on the merits and subsequently moved to dismiss without prejudice. 
                         
112 Travelers Property Casualty Corp., C.A. 17902 (Mar. 21, 2000). 
    113 In re Captec Net Lease Realty Inc. Shareholder Litig., C.A. 19008 (July 19, 2001). 
 
    114 In re Authentic Fitness Group, Inc. Shareholder Litig., C.A. 17464 (Oct. 12, 1999). 
 
    115 In re White Cap Industries, Inc. C. A. 17329 (July 22, 1999). 
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 The other four dismissed cases involved allegations of other kinds of self-dealing in 
connection with mergers. In only one of them, BHC Communications,116 was there a significant 
level of litigation activity.  
 
2. Mergers not involving a conflict of interests 
 
 a. Mergers clearly involving a sale of control.  We predicted that challenges to mergers 
involving arm’s-length sales of control were not likely to result in monetary recoveries, absent 
the emergence of a competing offer, but that complaints making such allegations would have 
some settlement value because they would allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to impose on defendants 
the litigation costs involved in proving that they had met their Revlon duties and would also 
provide defendants with an opportunity to obtain “litigation insurance” at a relatively modest 
cost. 
 
Our results were largely consistent with that prediction. In no such case did a competing 
bid emerge. Six (50%) of the cases settled, but none of those settlements involved any monetary 
recovery. Four of the settlements involved additional disclosures, none of which appeared to 
support plaintiffs’ initial claims of unfairness. In the remaining two settlements, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys negotiated provisions that had some potential to produce improved terms for public 
shareholders but that in reality yielded nothing. 
 
 Of the six (50%) cases that were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, none involved 
a target for which a higher bid was made after suit was filed. In two, plaintiffs’ attorneys moved 
to dismiss after defendants filed and briefed motions to dismiss. 
 
 b. Mergers arguably involving a sale of control.  We predicted that challenges to 
transactions in this category would be less attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys, because they would 
likely be required to litigate on the merits the question of whether Revlon applied, but that they 
also would be more likely to result in monetary recovery if plaintiffs succeeded on that issue, 
since the target’s board probably would not have sought the highest value reasonably available. 
 
 Only three mergers in this category were challenged. One case settled, and the other two 
were dismissed.  The settled case, IXC Communications,117 was largely prosecuted by a former 
executive of IXC who held 2.4% of its stock, worth roughly $44 million.  (We will discuss it 
further in Section E below.)   In the two cases that were dismissed voluntarily, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys claimed that the defendant corporations had agreed to sales of control without 
complying with Revlon. In neither case did a competing bid emerge, and in neither case did 
plaintiffs’ attorneys engage in significant litigation activities after filing their complaints. 
 
    116 In re BHC Communications Inc. Shareholder Litig., C.A. 18209 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
 
    117 In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholder Litig., C.A. 17324 (July 21, 1999). 
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 c. Mergers involving defensive tactics.  We predicted that plaintiffs’ attorneys would 
challenge mergers in this category either because a competing bid seemed likely (or was 
pending) or in the hope that a competing bid would emerge. If one did, we predicted that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys probably would be in a position to realize substantial fees largely as a result 
of the efforts of the competing bidder. If no bid emerged, we predicted that they would probably 
abandon their claims by moving to dismiss without prejudice because success on the merits 
would be unlikely. 
 
 Our results largely were consistent with these predictions. Of the four class actions that 
resulted in monetary settlements, three challenged mergers or defensive tactics where a hostile 
bid had been made, and the fourth challenged a merger that was subsequently challenged by a 
hostile bidder. In all four cases, the hostile bidder assumed primary responsibility for challenging 
the target company’s defensive tactics, and in all four cases the target company was acquired for 
a higher price. Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ attorneys sought and received substantial  fees of 
$1,050,000 ($1,085 per hour), $3,750,000 ($2,750 per hour), $9,450,000 ($1,630 per hour) and 
$625,000 (hourly information was not available), the last of which was paid by the acquiror after 
the original merger was abandoned and the target agreed to a second, friendly deal at a higher 
price. 
 
 In three of the eight cases that were dismissed, no higher bid emerged. Higher bids were 
made for the defendant corporations in three others, and an arguably higher bid was made for the 
defendant in a fourth.  Further, in a fifth case, Newport News Shipbuilding,118 a hostile bid of 
equal value succeeded after the Department of Defense, whose support was critical, expressed its 
support for the second bidder. One plausible explanation for why plaintiffs’ attorneys did not 
engage in more significant litigation activity in these four (or five) cases relates to the fact that in 
none of them did the successful bidder initiate a lawsuit challenging its target’s allegedly 
improper defensive actions. This suggests that the bidders did not view those defenses as 
significant impediments, which also would tend to undercut any Unocal claims made by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. In addition, in the absence of lawsuits by the bidders, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
had no opportunity to free ride on the litigation efforts of others. 
 
 d. Mergers not involving a sale of control or defensive tactics.  Our predictions concerning 
these cases were similar to those involving cases challenging mergers involving defensive 
tactics: Plaintiffs’ attorneys would file on spec, free ride if a competing bid emerged, and 
otherwise move to dismiss without prejudice because they would have little prospect of success 
on the merits. 
 
 Our results were entirely consistent with these predictions insofar as they related to the 
10 cases that were dismissed. None of the defendant corporations became targets of competing 
bids, and in none of those cases was there significant litigation activity by plaintiffs’ attorneys 
 
     118 In re Newport News Shipbuilding, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. 18871 (May 9, 2001). 
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after the complaints were filed. 
 
 The two cases that were settled for monetary recoveries did not involve competing bids, 
but nonetheless were not inconsistent with our predictions. Both grew out of post-announcement 
events that could not easily have been anticipated when the class actions originally were filed.  It 
is noteworthy that in both cases the plaintiffs’ attorneys accepted relatively modest fees. 
 
 3. Tender offers by a controlling shareholder 
 
 We predicted that cases challenging tender offers by controlling shareholders were more 
likely to result in, and effectively to be resolved by, substantive litigation because the law 
concerning such transactions was relatively unsettled for most of the period we studied. That 
proved to be the case. 
 
 Three such tender offers were challenged. In two, preliminary injunctions were sought 
and denied. Both cases were thereafter dismissed (although, in one case, the tender offer also 
failed.) In the third case, plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in some litigation activity, including 
taking one deposition, but then moved to dismiss without prejudice. 
 
 E. Cases with ‘Real’ Plaintiffs 
 
 In addition to the analyses described in Section D, we also examined class actions 
prosecuted by law firms that are not part of the ‘traditional plaintiffs’ bar’119 on behalf of clients 
with substantial financial stakes in the outcomes of those actions.120 Our thought was that if 
attorneys representing ‘real’ clients prosecuted class actions in much the same fashion as did 
traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys, that would suggest that traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys were acting 
as faithful champions of shareholders’ interests, while if the actions prosecuted by attorneys 
representing ‘real’ clients differed significantly, the differences would suggest that traditional 
plaintiffs’ attorneys act more like self-interested litigators. 
 
 We found five cases that were actively prosecuted on behalf of clients with substantial 
financial interests by law firms not generally identified as part of the ‘traditional plaintiffs’ bar.’121 
                         
    119 In TCW Technology Ltd. Partnership v. Intermedia Communications, Inc., 2000 WL 
1654504 at *3 (Del.Ch. 10/17/00). The court used this term to refer to law firms that we have also 
referred to as “plaintiffs’ attorneys” or the “plaintiffs’ bar.”  
    120 Given that we found only five cases in this category, see notes ___-___, infra, and 
accompanying text, no meaningful statistical analysis is possible. However, we believe that 
qualitative comparison of the two groups of cases provides significant support for the self-interested 
litigator hypothesis. 
    121 The named plaintiffs’ stakes were particularly large in Digex (more than 4%), IXC 
Communications (more than 2%) and SFX Entertainment (about 2%). Plaintiffs’ stock was valued at 
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In two cases, Digex122 and Telecorp PCS,123 such law firms acted as lead counsel for the plaintiff 
class. In two other cases, IXC Communications Corp.124  and SFX Entertainment Inc.,125 such law 
firms were not appointed lead counsel for the class but were allowed to litigate on behalf of their 
clients, subject to a requirement that they coordinate their efforts with those of lead counsel for the 
plaintiff class. In the fifth case, Siliconix,126 such a law firm’s client was appointed lead plaintiff, 
and the firm was appointed co-lead counsel, together with a firm generally identified as part of the 
traditional plaintiffs’ bar. 
 
 The pattern of litigation in these five cases differed remarkably from that in the other cases 
we studied. In none of them did the ‘real’ client file its complaint on the first or second day after 
the challenged merger was announced. The earliest complaint was filed six days later, the latest 
was filed 13 days later, and the median interval between announcement and filing was nine days. 
This suggested to us that substantial consultation between these attorneys and their clients probably 
had occurred before the clients authorized the filing of a complaint. Moreover, the complaints 
themselves tended to be considerably more detailed than the ‘bare bones’ complaints initially filed 
in these five actions or the complaints typically filed in other merger-related cases by the traditional 
plaintiffs’ bar.  
 
 The nature of the claims asserted by these substantial shareholders also was very different 
from the merger-related claims most frequently asserted by traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys — 
challenges to the fairness of the price offered or agreed to in squeeze outs, MBOs and arm’s length 
mergers. The substantial shareholders tended to make highly fact-specific claims that raised unique, 
rather than generic, legal or factual issues. Plaintiffs in Digex, SFX Entertainment and Telecorp 
PCS alleged that defendants had engaged in unfair self-dealing on the basis of facts specific to each 
 
more than $4 million in Siliconix and about $1 million in Telecorp PCS.  We found only two 
plaintiffs represented by members of the traditional plaintiffs’ bar that held stakes similar in size to 
those in Siliconix and Telecorp PCS. 
    122 In re Digex, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. 18336. 
    123 In re Telecorp PCS Inc. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. 19260. The firm named lead counsel 
resolved a conflict over that position by agreeing that, while it would serve as lead counsel, it and 
Abbey Gardy, a traditional plaintiffs’ firm, would jointly be designated “Plaintiffs’ Executive 
Committee.” 
    124 Crawford v. IXC Communications, Inc., C.A. 17334, which the court ordered be coordinated 
with In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. 117324. 
    125 Franklin Adviser, Inc. v. Sillerman, C.A. 17878, and In re SFX Entertainment Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation, C.A. 17818. 
    126 In re Siliconix, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. 18720. 
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of those transactions.127 Plaintiff in IXC Communications made an unusual claim to the effect that 
IXC’s board had agreed to sell the company in a stock-for-stock transaction solely for the purpose 
of avoiding its obligations under Revlon and also charged the acquiror with improperly paying 
cash, rather than stock, to another large shareholder to induce it to vote in support of the merger. 
Only Siliconix involved a challenge to the fairness of the price being offered, and that case involved 
a tender offer by a controlling shareholder — a setting in which, as noted above, considerable 
uncertainty existed as to the governing legal principles. 
 
 The attorneys representing all five of these substantial shareholder-plaintiffs engaged in 
extensive litigation activity following the filing of their complaints — actions consistent with a 
belief that the claims asserted had more than nuisance value. In three cases, Digex, IXC 
Communications and Siliconix, the attorneys representing the plaintiffs engaged in substantial 
expedited discovery and then briefed and argued substantive motions for preliminary injunctive 
relief, succeeding in part in Digex but not in IXC Communications or Siliconix.128 In SFX 
Entertainment, the attorneys for the shareholder-plaintiff also conducted expedited discovery and 
then moved for summary judgment, precipitating a substantial settlement.129 In Telecorp PCS, the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys successfully defended a motion to dismiss and thereafter engaged in substantial 
litigation activity in support of their claims. In contrast, in only three of the other 98 cases that we 
studied did traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys brief and argue similar substantive motions,130 and in 
only one case did a traditional plaintiffs’ attorney succeed in whole or part with respect to such a 
motion.131
                         
    127 Plaintiff in SFX Entertainment also alleged that the challenged merger violated a provision of 
the target corporation’s articles of incorporation. 
    128 We should note that the court in IXC was harshly critical of plaintiffs’ Revlon claim, stating: 
“To say that this claim is a serious factual stretch is as understated as I can be. . . . Plaintiffs need a 
serious reality check.” In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholder Litig., C.A. 17324, at 15 (Oct. 
27, 1999). (The court also acknowledged that vote buying seemed to have occurred, but held that it 
was not improper for an acquiror to buy a shareholder’s vote. It may be that the plaintiff in IXC, an 
individual, aggressively litigated his rather tenuous Revlon claim because he had so much at stake. 
His personal holding in IXC stock, based on the terms of the proposed merger, was worth more than 
$400 million. 
    129 Defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff class an amount equal to roughly 50% of the damages 
claimed.  The Franklin Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of the Settlement and in Support 
of the Petition for the Award of an Attorneys’ Fee, C.A. 17878, at 4-5 (Aug. 18, 2000). 
    130 We do not count in this total two cases in which hostile bidders briefed and argued motions 
relating to the validity of a target’s takeover defenses and plaintiffs’ attorneys also filed briefs and 
argued the same motions. 
    131 In Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002), plaintiffs’ attorneys successfully defeated 
defendant’s motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims relating to the acquisition of General 
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 When the cases prosecuted on behalf of substantial plaintiffs were settled, the nature of the 
settlements and fee arrangements also differed substantially from the norm in cases prosecuted by 
the traditional plaintiffs’ bar. Three of these cases resulted in very substantial recoveries — $165 
million in Digex, $47.5 million in Telecorp PCS and $34.5 million in SFX.132 Moreover, in all three 
of these cases the substantial plaintiff’s attorneys claimed that the recoveries were due solely to 
their efforts133 — a claim that was made in connection with only two of the 27 settlements 
involving monetary recoveries that were negotiated by traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys.134 In all 
three of these cases, too, the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee requests were consistent with their claim of 
sole credit, in that the fees requested represented a substantially higher percentage of the amounts 
recovered than did the fees requested by traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys where the latter’s litigation 
 
Cigar. 
    132 Plaintiffs in Siliconix voluntarily dismissed their suit after the court denied their motion for a 
preliminary injunction and stated that they were not likely to succeed on the merits. Crawford and 
the plaintiff class’ claims in IXC became moot when the value of the stock received by IXC 
shareholders increased sharply following the closing of the contested merger. They agreed to dismiss 
their substantive claims, but asserted that they were entitled to a fee award, under Tandycrafts. 
Cincinnati Bell, which had acquired IXC, agreed to pay $490,000 in fees and $75,000 in expenses to 
resolve the latter claim. 
    133 The SNC appointed by Digex’s board contested this claim, asserting that it was responsible for 
a substantial portion of the amount recovered by the plaintiff class and that, in any event, the fee 
sought was excessive. The court may well have credited one or the other of these arguments, in that 
it reduced plaintiffs’ fee request by 50%. 
    134 Seagate and Travelers.  We have not placed Wolfson v. Cunningham, C.A. 17155, in this 
category, although it could be argued that plaintiffs’ attorneys there also were responsible for the 
benefit to the class. That case involved a class action challenging the adequacy of the consideration 
to be received in a stock-for-stock merger of Compass International Services Corporation into NCO 
Group, Inc. The parties initially agreed to a settlement that created a downside “collar” under 
which additional NCO shares worth $1.2 million would be issued if the price of NCO stock 
dropped below $29.50. Compass’s earnings and revenues subsequently declined, and the price of 
NCO stock increased. NCO advised Compass that it would consummate the merger only if the 
value of the stock to be issued was reduced by $5 million. The parties then revised the settlement 
to provide that the entire $5 million price reduction would be borne by management shareholders 
of Compass, by reducing number of NCO shares to be issued to them. This generated a benefit 
worth $2.9 million to public shareholders. The original settlement provided that plaintiffs would 
move for an award of fees and expenses of $250,000, which defendants reserved the right to 
oppose. Defendants indicated that effort by plaintiffs’ attorneys to increase their fee after the 
settlement was revised would put the entire agreement at risk.  Plaintiffs elected not to ask for 
increased fee, and defendants elected not to oppose their $250,000 fee request.  
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efforts were purported to be only partially responsible for whatever financial benefit was realized 
by the plaintiff class. Finally, in none of these three cases did the substantial plaintiff’s attorneys 
attempt to negotiate a fee award payable by defendants. Rather, in all three the plaintiff’s attorneys 
sought judicial approval of fees payable from the common fund that their efforts had created. This 
contrasts sharply with the fee arrangements negotiated by traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys, which, in 
all of the cases that we studied, involved agreements by defendants to pay (up to some agreed upon 
limit) whatever attorneys’ fees the court awarded. 
 
 F. The Delaware Courts’ Monitoring of Merger-Related Class Actions  
 
Finally, we considered what the data that we had gathered suggested about whether the 
Delaware Chancery Court was effectively monitoring merger-related class actions to ensure that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys were not exploiting their ‘license to litigate’ primarily to enrich themselves. 
We did not give a great deal of weight to one datum — that all of the settlements negotiated by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys received judicial approval — because courts in general are notoriously 
reluctant to disapprove negotiated settlements of complex corporate litigation.135 Nonetheless, 
the Chancery Court’s 100% approval rate clearly provides no support for claims that the Court is 
acting as an effective monitor or is alert to the possibility of collusion.136
 
We found the reluctance of the Chancery Court to involve itself in the process by which 
lead counsel is appointed to be somewhat more troubling.  We found that when multiple class 
action complaints were filed, the court allowed (or encouraged) the plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
                         
     135 A number of factors impair the effectiveness of courts’ review. Perhaps the most important 
is that settlement hearings rarely are adversarial. As Judge Henry Friendly pointed out many 
years ago: “Once a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms 
with their former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork . . . .” Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 
F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 
1965) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966). Similarly, Professors Macey and Miller 
describe settlement hearings as “pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense 
counsel.” Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, cited in note __, at 46. 
 
     136 We have no basis to believe that any of the settlements we reviewed were explicitly 
collusive. However, as discussed above, see text at note __-__, the potential for tacitly collusive 
settlements exists, especially in cases involving squeeze outs and MBOs in which a SNC has 
invited plaintiffs’ attorneys to participate in its deliberations. It also is in those mergers that the 
“independent” directors who serve on SNCs are most likely to have divided loyalties. See Allen, 
cited in note __.  Further, as is discussed in the text below, attorneys for both plaintiffs and 
defendants in these cases are repeat players.  It is a well understood proposition in game theory 
that players who are involved in repeated plays of the same game (so long as there is no 
specified end point) are more likely to achieve tacitly collusive outcomes than are players in one-
shot games; see, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, MICROECONOMICS, 5th edn. 
(2001). 
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filed complaints to resolve the lead counsel issue through private negotiations. This finding was 
completely consistent with the description that Franklin Balotti, an experienced Delaware 
practitioner, recently provided to the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel. 137 
Indeed, as Mr. Balotti pointed out, “on the few occasions when Delaware courts have had to 
confront organizational disputes among plaintiffs’ counsel, they have repeatedly admonished 
counsel to organize themselves.”138
 
The plaintiffs’ bar has responded to these admonishments by adopting a simple decision 
rule to determine which attorney or law firm should be appointed lead counsel: a presumption 
that the attorney or law firm who filed the first class action complaint should be named lead or 
co-lead counsel.139 Thus, the Chancery Court’s hands-off approach has had the unfortunate effect 
of promoting the ‘race to the courthouse’ evidenced by our finding that the first complaints in the 
vast majority of merger-related cases were filed within one day after the challenged mergers 
were announced. Moreover, the court appears insensitive to the link between the approach that it 
has adopted and its expression of concern that “[t]oo often judges of this Court face complaints 
filed hastily, minutes or hours after a transaction is announced, based on snippets from the print 
or electronic media. Such pleadings are remarkable, but only because of the speed with which 
they are filed in reaction to an announced transaction.” 140
 
 
     137 R. Franklin Balotti, Written Statement for Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class 
Counsel 1 (2001), avail. 
<http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/appendix%20B%20Volume%201.htm>. 
 
     138 Id. See also TCW Technology Ltd. Partnership v. Intermedia Communications, Inc., supra, 
in which Chancellor Chandler confirms that the court’s custom is to encourage counsel in class 
and derivative actions to reach agreement as to how and by whom an action should be 
prosecuted and notes with apparent regret that “Over the past ten years, members of the Court of 
Chancery have been asked, with increasing frequency, to become involved in the sometimes 
unseemly internecine struggles within the plaintiffs’ bar over the power to control, direct and 
(one suspects) ultimately settle shareholder lawsuits filed in this jurisdiction.” Id. at *3. 
 
     139 Members of the plaintiffs’ bar have informally confirmed to us that this is the decision rule 
most frequently used. See also Balotti, supra (commenting that this approach has some support 
in Delaware precedent). We found only one case, In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. 
18373, in which members of the traditional plaintiffs’ bar sought judicial intervention because 
they were unable to resolve the lead counsel issue through private negotiation. The other cases in 
which the court got involved in that issue all involved law firms representing “real” clients. See 
note __, supra. 
 
    140 TCW Technology Ltd. Partnership, supra, at *3.  Given the court’s announced preference 
for a hands-off approach, its statement that neither Delaware law nor custom support the belief 
that the first to file deserves a preference, see id., seems largely irrelevant. 
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The findings to which we attach the most significance, though, are those relating to fee 
awards, because we believe that the Chancery Court’s authority to award attorney fees provides 
it with potentially its most effective mechanism to regulate the conduct of the plaintiffs’ bar.141 
We found 47 cases in which the Chancery Court passed on fee requests from traditional 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.142 In 40 of these, or 85%, the court awarded all fees requested. Two prior 
studies of Delaware Chancery Court litigation, one covering 98 settlements of class and 
derivative actions reviewed between 1990 and 1992143 and another covering 138 settlements 
reviewed between January 1, 1998, and April 15, 2001,144 suggest that this is somewhat above 
the norm. Both of those studies found that all fees requested were approved in only two-thirds of 
the cases studied. Moreover, the absence of a demand requirement, which makes it considerably 
more likely that a class action will be filed and settled primarily because of its nuisance value, 
makes the higher rate of full approvals in merger-related class actions even more surprising.145
 
 The specifics of the cases in which objections were filed and fees were reduced further 
suggest lax judicial oversight of the manner in which plaintiffs’ attorneys litigated merger-
related class actions. Table 10 lists the cases in which fees were reduced, the judge involved, 
whether an objection was made to the fee request of plaintiffs’ attorneys,146 and the percentage 
by which the court reduced the fees requested.147 There were only two cases in which objections 
 
    141 As Chancellor Chandler explained in Fuqua, Delaware courts use the promise of fee 
awards as an incentive to encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to enforce the duties of corporate 
fiduciaries, recognize that this may lead plaintiffs’ attorneys to act out of self-interest rather than 
in shareholders’ interests, and should use their power over fee awards to penalize or minimize 
self-interested behavior. See text at notes _-_. 
    142 We counted IXC Communications in this category because the fee request there was made 
jointly by traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys, as lead counsel for the class, and the law firm that 
represented Mr. Crawford. See note __, supra. 
    143 Carolyn Berger & Darla Pomeroy, Settlement Fever, 2 Bus. L. Today 7 (Sept./Oct. 1992). 
 
    144 William B. Chandler III, Awarding Counsel Fees in Class and Derivative Litigation in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, Presented to the Conference on the Role of Judges in Corporate 
and Securities Law, University of Michigan Law School (April 20, 2001). 
 
    145 On the other hand, derivative suits may be more likely to settle for non-monetary relief of 
questionable value. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 
7 J. L. Econ & Org. 55 (1991). 
    146 We counted only objections supported by briefs, not letters sent by class members 
expressing general concern about or disagreement with proposed fee awards. 
    147 The court also reduced the requested fees in two cases in which the class was represented 
by attorneys representing a substantial shareholder. In Telecorp PCS, the attorneys requested 
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were filed. Both involved somewhat serendipitous circumstances. In Banctec, an objection was 
filed by Professor Weiss’ colleague,148 and in Donna Karan International, one was filed by a 
class member that initially was a named plaintiff in that action and that frequently has been a 
named plaintiff in corporate litigation,149 but that apparently had a falling out with the plaintiffs’ 
law firm with which it had been aligned.150
 
One could view the small number of objections as evidence that shareholders in general 
are satisfied with the efforts of plaintiffs’ attorneys, but we do not construe it in that fashion.151 
As noted above, every case settled by a traditional plaintiffs’ attorney involved a provision in the 
Stipulation of Settlement to the effect that attorney fees (up to some agreed upon amount) would 
be paid by defendants, rather than from a common fund or by members of the plaintiff class. By 
allowing settlements to be so structured, the Chancery Court has reduced considerably the 
likelihood that objections will be filed. Defendants in all such cases had committed themselves 
not to object to plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee requests.152 And members of the plaintiff class had no 
financial incentive to object, since the fees were not coming directly out of their pockets — as 
would have been the case had those fees been payable from a common fund.153 Consequently, 
 
$14.25 million in fees, plus reimbursement of expenses of approximately $350,000. The court 
awarded $14.25 million for fees and expenses combined, a reduction of about 2%. In Digex, as 
discussed in note __ supra, the SNC disputed the attorneys’ claim that they were solely 
responsible for the settlement and also challenged the amount of fees requested. The court 
awarded 50% of the fees requested. 
    148 See note __, supra. 
    149 See Thompson & Thomas, supra, finding that the class member that filed the objection in 
Donna Karan International, Harbor Finance Partners, served most frequently as a named 
plaintiff in the cases that they studied.  
 
    150 See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of the Proposed Settlement and Application for Attorneys’ 
Fees and Expenses, In re Donna Karan International Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. 18559, at 
29-31 (Sept. 4, 2002). 
 
    151 See Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in 
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, [this volume](finding that objections 
are infrequent and questioning whether courts should attach much weight to the absence of 
objections). 
 
    152 We did find two cases in which defendants initially indicated that they intended object to 
the size of plaintiffs’ fee request. In both, plaintiffs’ attorneys then agreed to reduce the size of 
their fee requests in exchange for defendants’ agreement not to object.  
    153 In contrast, all three settlements negotiated by attorneys representing “real” clients called 
for payment of fees from the common funds created by their efforts. 
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the Chancery Court’s tolerance of this settlement structure itself suggested to us that the court 
had little interest in encouraging class members to scrutinize closely the fee awards requested by 
their self-appointed champions. 
 
 Even more striking, though, were the court’s reactions to the arguments advanced by the 
two objectors. In Banctec, the objector argued that no fee should be awarded primarily because 
plaintiffs had filed a suit for which they had no factual basis, had found no evidence to support 
their claims and had then negotiated a settlement calling for supplemental disclosures that 
provided members of the plaintiff class with information of no significance.154 In Donna Karan 
International155, the objector argued that the suit had been filed prematurely, because plaintiffs’ 
attorneys should have waited to see if the board of Donna Karan International (DKI) accepted 
the challenged buy-out offer; that DKI was not controlled by persons affiliated with the offeror 
because another shareholder group owned almost as many shares; that the increase in price was 
attributable almost entirely to the efforts of DKI’s SNC and the other large shareholder group; 
that the number of hours claimed by plaintiffs’ attorneys was excessive given the limited 
litigation activity they had undertaken; and that most work claimed by plaintiffs’ attorneys was 
done by partners even though it was routine.156
 
The court appeared to credit both objectors’ arguments, in that it reduced plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fee request by 90% in Banctec and by 78% in DKI.157 Yet arguments identical or 
similar to those made by objectors in Banctec and DKI, in our view, could be made with 
comparable force with respect to a substantial majority of the class action settlements that we 
examined. However, where no objector appeared to make them, the Chancery Court rarely took 
the initiative. In only one other case, IBP, did the court reduce the requested attorneys’ fees by 
more than 50%, and there the benefit for which plaintiffs’ attorneys claimed credit was, in a 
sense, antithetical to the theory on the basis on which those class actions initially had been 
filed.158 In only four other cases were fees reduced at all, and in all but one of those the 
 
    154 See Objection to Proposed Settlement and Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees, In re 
Banctec, Inc. Shareholders’ Litig., C.A. 17092 (May 22, 2000). 
 
155 In re Donna Karan International Inc. Shareholders’ Litig., C.A. 18559 . 
    156 See Plaintiff Harbor Finance’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Their Petition for 
Fees and Expenses, In re Donna Karan International Inc. Shareholders’ Litig., C.A. 18559 
(Sept. 9, 2002)). 
 
    157 As noted above, Professor Weiss’ objection in Calmat, a merger not included in our study, 
resulted in a sharp (67%) reduction in the fees requested by plaintiffs’ attorneys there. See note 
__. 
    158 Plaintiffs initially challenged the fairness of a proposed MBO. A bidding contest thereafter 
developed, and IBP agreed to be acquired by Tyson Foods, Inc. and plaintiffs amended their 
complaint to challenge the fairness of that merger. Before that suit could be resolved, Tyson 
attempted to back out of its agreement with IBP. IBP, supported by plaintiffs, responded by 
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reductions were made by the same Vice-Chancellor.159 In 89% of the cases in which no objection 
was filed, the court awarded to plaintiffs’ attorneys all of the fees that they requested. 
 
 The Chancery Court appears to base its hands-off approach on the fact that Delaware 
practice calls for plaintiffs’ attorneys to refrain from discussing fees with defendants until after 
the substantive terms of a settlement have been agreed upon and that defendants consequently 
have “a 100 percent direct dollar-for-dollar interest in getting the lowest fee [they can].”160 This 
reasoning, it seems to us, reflects a naive or simplistic view of the dynamics of the settlement 
process.161 Attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants in these cases almost always are repeat 
players. As such, they know at the time that they negotiate a MOU setting forth the terms of a 
proposed class action settlement that the attorney fee issue ultimately will have to be 
addressed.162 They also know that if the proposed merger closes before confirmatory discovery is 
completed and the formal Stipulation of Settlement is signed — which typically is the case — 
plaintiffs’ attorneys almost certainly will expect defendants to pay whatever fees subsequently 
are awarded.163 Moreover, as an economic matter, we find it hard to believe that defendants in 
these cases do not have some “bottom line” on the total amount that they are prepared to pay, to 
the plaintiff class and/or to plaintiffs’ attorneys, in order to consummate a proposed merger.  
Thus, we suspect, some “shadow negotiation” of fee awards inevitably occurs. The vehicle for 
this negotiation may well be the conversation in which attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants 
discuss the wording of the clause in the standard MOU in which defendants acknowledge the 
extent to which plaintiffs’ attorneys’ efforts have contributed to whatever benefit the class is 
 
bringing suit to enforce its agreement with Tyson. It was the court’s decision holding that this 
agreement was specifically enforceable that served as the basis for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ request 
for a fee award. 
 
    159 Our sample may be atypical in this respect. Chandler, supra note __, found that decisions 
reducing fee requests were made by all members of the Chancery Court. Id., App. A. 
 
    160 In re Travelers Property Casualty Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. 17902, Ruling 
Following Settlement Hearing at 7 (Oct. 19, 2000). 
    161 In making this statement, we are not suggesting that plaintiffs’ attorneys, contrary to the 
representations that they customarily make to the court, explicitly discuss proposed fee awards 
with defendants prior to reaching final agreement on a settlement’s substantive terms. 
    162 Moreover, the attorneys also know that if they surprise the opposing attorneys in any given 
case, their actions are likely to make it more difficult for them to negotiate settlements in future 
cases. 
    163 Not only is this the customary practice, but the only alternative would be to ask that fees be 
assessed against and collected from the members of the plaintiff class.  
  
 
 49
                        
purported to have realized.164
 
 At a minimum, examination of the settlements we studied, of the Chancery Court’s 
decisions in the two cases in which objections were filed, and of that court’s decisions in the 
much larger number of cases in which no objection was filed suggest to us that the court did not 
use its power to control fee awards to monitor effectively the litigation efforts of the plaintiffs’ 
bar. Why, for example, was the court prepared to reduce dramatically the attorneys’ fees 
requested in Banctec and Donna Karan International, but not similarly prepared to make similar 
cuts in the fees requested in the far larger number of cases in which similar objections could be 
made but no objector appeared? That the defendants in those other cases were prepared to pay 
the fees requested does not strike us as a persuasive response, for the reasons outlined above.165 
What the court should have appreciated, we believe, is that defendants’ willingness to pay 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees may well have represented either a strategic concession that so 
proceeding was the least costly means of disposing of a lawsuit that lacked merit but had 
nuisance value or an implicit pay-off to the plaintiffs’ attorneys in exchange for their 
acquiescence in the terms negotiated by a SNC. By approving those fee arrangements — which 
usually provided plaintiffs’ attorneys with very high hourly compensation166 — the Court 
effectively encouraged plaintiffs’ attorneys to continue litigating merger-related class actions in 
a manner that, by and large, appears to advance only the interests of those attorneys. 
 
 G. An Assessment 
 
 We began this Part by laying out two alternative hypotheses as to what drives shareholder 
 
    164 For example, discussions might focus on whether defendants are prepared to say that a 
SNC was aware of the pendency of plaintiffs’ claims, that the SNC took account of plaintiffs’ 
arguments or that plaintiffs’ efforts contributed to whatever increase in price the SNC negotiated. 
The stronger is defendants’ acknowledgment of plaintiffs’ “contribution,” the stronger will be 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ claim for a substantial fee award. 
    165 One also might ask: If it was appropriate for the Court to rely on defendants’ judgments in 
those cases, then why did the Court not rely on defendants’ judgments in the two cases where 
objections were filed?  
    166 This is especially so if one considers two additional factors. First, upwards of 40% of the 
hours that plaintiffs’ attorneys devote to these cases generally are expended after a MOU is 
signed, and thus involve virtually no contingency risk. Second, at least some of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ claims of hours worked appear inflated. In Sodexho Marriott Services Inc., C.A. 
18640, for example, the three firms that were appointed as co-lead counsel claimed that they had 
spent a total of 70.8 hours on legal research and preparing pleadings, even though their 
complaints all were filed within two days after that proposed squeeze out was announced, were 
virtually identical, and involved virtually identical allegations that were quite similar to 
allegations that the same law firms had made in many similar cases. 
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litigation, especially with respect to merger-related class actions in the Delaware courts: the 
shareholder champion hypothesis, and the self-interested litigator hypothesis.  We believe that the 
evidence presented in Sections B-F, taken as a whole, strongly supports the self-interested litigator 
hypothesis. 
 
 In Section B we provided an analysis of which mergers tend to be challenged by class-action 
shareholder lawsuits.  We found that important influences on the likelihood that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
would challenge a merger were the size of the transaction, the (inverse of the) size of the initial 
premium offered to the target company’s shareholders, the presence of an all-cash deal (representing 
a sale of control), and the presence of an acquiror with a significant prior stake in the target or other 
appearances of conflict of interest.  Though these influences could be interpreted as consistent with 
either hypothesis, the overall conclusion nevertheless is that this particular type of litigation is 
systematic and purposive, and not the result of random decisions on the part of plaintiffs or their 
attorneys. 
 
 The tendency of mergers to be challenged where the acquiror had a prior stake or there were 
other conflicts poses an especially interesting and subtle problem of interpretation.  It may be the 
case that there are continuing abuses in these kinds of transactions (although it is unclear why the 
prospects of costly litigation has not deterred them).  But another possibility should be considered.  
Could it be that, given the structure of Delaware law that we described in Part II, an acquiror's prior 
stake in the target (or an acquiror’s arrangements to continue to employ and reward the incumbent 
management), and the possibility of insider abuses that are thereby raised, often presents too 
tempting a target for plaintiffs' attorneys?  If this is so, and especially if a SNC has not yet had a 
chance to consider the acquiror’s offer at the time that the offer is made public, then an acquiror with 
a prior stake may simply have to face the likelihood that a class action lawsuit will be filed, 
regardless of the price that the acquiror initially offers to the other stockholders.  This prospect 
would surely reinforce the bargaining instincts that in any event might lead an acquiror initially to 
make a “low ball” offer, which it then would be prepared to increase in subsequent negotiations with 
the SNC. Although such lowballing would increase the probability that a class action will be filed 
following the announcement of a squeeze out or an MBO, thus generating an unfortunate 
equilibrium of lawsuits’ being filed whenever acquirors have prior stakes in their targets, it also 
might present acquirors with opportunities to insulate such mergers from scrutiny by arranging 
advantageous settlements with the plaintiffs’ bar. 167  The creation of this kind of equilibrium would 
be most consistent with the self-interested litigator hypothesis. 
 
 We next turned in Section C to an overview description of the 104 mergers that were 
challenged and the characteristics of the litigation.  An initial complaint was filed within the first two 
days after the merger announcement in over 80% of the merger challenges.  Multiple complaints 
 
    167 An acquiror would know that few cases are actually litigated to a judgment on the merits and 
that the costs of delay for most mergers are high, perhaps including the unraveling of the transaction. 
If an acquiror can settle such a suit for a comparatively modest sum, it may find that prospect 
attractive, especially if doing so will allow the transaction to proceed to completion. 
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were filed in most cases.  This pattern of early and frequent filings is one that is consistent with 
opportunistic behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys – in short, the self-interested litigator hypothesis. 
 
 Settlements occurred in slightly less than 50% of the cases that have been resolved.  No 
cases were litigated to a judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs.  Of the cases that were 
dismissed, over 90% were dropped before there were any judicial decisions that addressed the merits 
of the lawsuit, and very few of these voluntary dismissals involved significant litigation efforts by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Where the settlements involved claimed monetary recoveries, the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys most often appeared to have free ridden on the decisions of SNCs or on improved terms 
offered by a competing bidder, rarely claimed full credit for the purported recovery, and never 
persisted in challenging improved terms negotiated by a SNC (or the terms proposed by a competing 
bidder).  Further, in settled cases, although plaintiffs’ attorneys’ requests for fees tended to be a low 
percentage of the claimed recoveries168 (arguably an admission by the attorneys that they contributed 
little to the recoveries), they generally represented rich rewards when measured on an hourly basis. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys also tended to do well even when settlements did not involve any monetary 
recovery.  Since settlements occurred in slightly less than half of the lawsuits filed, and since the 
hours and efforts devoted to the lawsuits that were dismissed generally were very modest, the overall 
returns to plaintiffs’ attorneys from filing merger-related class actions appear to be attractive.  Again, 
this pattern is consistent with opportunistic behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys.  
 
 The fact that the aggregate legal fees in settled cases tend to be a relatively low percentage of 
claimed monetary recoveries has two potential interpretations, the second of which adds to our sense 
of unease about this process.  On the one hand, lower fees could be evidence of the efficiency (low 
relative transactions costs) and the modest aspirations of the plaintiffs’ bar (and the reason why 
Delaware courts only infrequently award less than all fees requested).  On the other hand, they can 
be seen as a practical admission that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ efforts contributed little to the improved 
terms in these transactions and that plaintiffs’ attorneys were largely free riding on improvements 
that would have occurred anyway.  We find the second interpretation more persuasive. 
 
 We next provided in Section D a summary of our detailed examination of all 104 challenged 
mergers and the accompanying litigation against the backdrop of the type of merger.  This analysis 
again supports a picture of free riding with little “value added” by plaintiffs’ attorneys in most cases, 
again supporting the self-interested litigator hypothesis. 
 
 We recognize that our analysis in Section D does not answer definitively one key 
question: whether the class actions that we studied and, in particular, the cases involving 
improvements in the terms of squeeze outs and MBOs, (a) actually produced improvements in 
the terms of mergers, (b) involved no more than free riding by plaintiffs’ attorneys, or (c) often 
involved tacitly collusive settlements in which plaintiffs’ attorneys dropped their objections to 
 
    168 They are relatively low in the sense that a frequent percentage figure in plaintiff 
contingency cases is 33% and sizable legal fees are frequently earned by plaintiffs’ attorneys in 
successful antitrust treble damages cases as well as in the recent tobacco litigation cases. 
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arguably unfair mergers in exchange for defendants’ implicit assurances that they would finance 
relatively generous attorney fee awards.169 It may be, as members of the plaintiffs’ bar have 
argued to us, that plaintiffs’ attorneys are so committed to vigorous advocacy of shareholders’ 
interests that the incentives provided by Delaware law, even if perverse, are not sufficient to 
cause them to deviate from that commitment. However, we remain skeptical that such is the 
case. Our other findings (and economic theory) all suggest it is far more likely that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are motivated primarily by self-interest and that their litigation efforts, shaped as they 
are by the incentives provided by Delaware law, produce little in the way of meaningful benefits 
for the shareholders that those attorneys purport to represent. 
 
 In section E we contrasted five cases, where ’real’ plaintiffs with substantial stakes were 
represented by attorneys who were outside the ’traditional’ plaintiffs’ bar, with the remaining 99 
cases that were prosecuted by the traditional bar.  In those five cases, litigation was more substantial; 
in three, the plaintiffs achieved significant monetary recoveries; and, reflecting the significant roles 
that they played, plaintiffs’ attorneys in those three settlements received fees that were a higher 
fraction of the recoveries than was the norm and that were paid out of a common fund rather than 
directly by defendants (as was the norm in cases settled by traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys).  This 
sharply different litigation pattern for these five cases suggests to us that the norm for the other 99 is 
better explained by the self-interested litigator hypothesis. 
 
 Finally, in Section F we examined the Delaware courts reviews of settlements and of 
attorney fee awards.  We found that no settlements were overturned by the courts, and that in 85% of 
the settled cases the courts approved the fee requests from the traditional plaintiffs’ attorneys; 
further, the fees are almost always paid by defendants rather than out of a common fund, so that 
members of the plaintiff class have little basis for objecting.  We argue that this record of relatively 
lax review is likely to encourage a pattern of litigation driven by the self-interested litigator 
hypothesis. 
 
 In sum, the pattern that we observe in the class action shareholder lawsuits that were filed 
against merger targets in Delaware courts is redolent of a pattern of opportunistic filings, of a 
lawyer-driven process rather than a true client-driven process: 
 
• systematic behavior with respect to which mergers were challenged 
• early and frequent complaints filed; 
• a very high percentage of dismissed cases never reached a judgment on the merits; 
• the absence of a single case that has been decided in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits; 
• settlements tending to reflect free riding by plaintiffs’ attorneys; 
 
  169 No definitive answer is possible because it is not possible to determine on what terms, in 
a world of perfect information, these class actions would have been resolved. The question is 
important, though, both because these cases account for a majority of the monetary settlements 
negotiated by the plaintiffs’ bar and because it was settlements such as these that led Thompson 
and Thomas to conclude that shareholder class actions “deserved a seat at the table of corporate 
governance.” See text at note __, supra. 
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• plaintiffs’ attorneys failing to persist in challenges to SNCs’ decisions or to competing 
offers; 
• attorneys with ’real’ clients and from outside the ’traditional’ Delaware plaintiffs’ bar were 
far more vigorous in their litigation efforts on behalf of their clients; 
• no settlements overturned by the Delaware courts; 
• plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee awards in settlements usually paid by defendants and not out of 
common funds, and largely unchallenged; and 
• plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees representing a strikingly low percentage of claimed recoveries 
(even though they are attractive on an hourly basis), which may well indicate that the 
attorneys added little value to the recoveries. 
 
 In sum, it is a pattern that is far more consistent with the self-interested litigator hypothesis 
than with the shareholder champion hypothesis.  We find this picture quite troubling, as it suggests 
that merger-related class actions primarily serve as a vehicle through which the plaintiffs’ bar (and to 
some extent the defense bar) are able to extract rents from the shareholders of Delaware 
corporations. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 
We began by hypothesizing that Delaware law provides plaintiffs’ attorneys with 
substantial incentives to initiate, prosecute and settle merger-related class actions in a manner 
that advances their own economic interests rather than those of the shareholders they purport to 
represent. Our analysis of relevant economic and litigation-related data strongly suggests that the 
plaintiffs’ bar, at least with respect to mergers announced in 1999 through 2001, responded to 
these incentives in a predictably self-interested fashion. We found those results troubling, the 
more so because the litigation environment in Delaware today is largely the same as it was 
during the years that we studied. 
 
Merger-related class actions have become the dominant form of shareholder litigation in 
Delaware. If such actions continue to serve primarily as devices that enrich plaintiffs’ attorneys 
while providing shareholders with little in the way of meaningful benefits, they will undermine 
an important pillar of Delaware’s system of corporate governance. As Professor James Cox has 
observed:  
 
Much like the shepherd who cries wolf too frequently, shareholder suits, if commonly 
understood to be frivolous, will not in their commencement, prosecution and settlement 
affirm the social norms the suit’s defendants allegedly violated. Their defendants will 
instead be seen as the objects of bad luck not derision. Thus, the procedural context in 
which corporate and securities norms are developed and affirmed are of the utmost 
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significance if those norms are to discipline managers.170
 
 We are confident that Delaware’s courts did not deliberately set out to construct a 
litigation environment with such a strong propensity to generate agency costs. Rather, the 
current, unsatisfactory situation appears to have evolved largely as a consequence of the 
interaction between Delaware’s existing system of privatized enforcement and a series of recent 
decisions that address, seriatim, a variety of difficult substantive problems relating to mergers, 
takeovers, and takeover defenses. Nonetheless, given the unfortunate impact that those 
substantive decisions appear to have had on merger-related class action litigation, some remedial 
action by Delaware’s courts appears to be in order.  
 
 Specifying the remedial actions the courts should take, however, poses a ticklish 
problem. Corporate governance and corporate litigation involve dynamic processes. How they 
will be affected by any given change in the law often is hard to predict and, as data in this paper 
make clear, well-meaning changes often produce unintended (and unfortunate) consequences.171 
Consequently, we set forth our suggestions for change with a strong sense of modesty. We 
recognize that, as academics, we may not be sufficiently sensitive to practical problems that 
those changes may produce for the courts or to how either plaintiffs’ or defense attorneys are 
likely to react if the changes that we propose are implemented.172  
 
 Our first suggestion relates to the process by which lead plaintiff and lead counsel are 
appointed. Given the time pressures that surround most merger-related class actions, we do not 
believe it feasible for Delaware courts to implement procedures similar to those used by federal 
courts to appoint lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in securities class actions. However, we believe 
 
  170 James D. Cox, “The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits,” 65 Brook. L.Rev. 3, 6 (1999).  
 171 For example, Lynch I may have adopted a rule to the effect that approval of a squeeze out 
by a SNC will shift to plaintiff the burden of proving that the squeeze out is unfair, at least in 
part, so as to encourage use of truly independent SNCs. But that rule appears to have had the 
effect of encouraging plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle cases challenging squeeze outs, largely 
without regard to whether the merger terms agreed to by a SNC are entirely fair.  
 
 172 We recognize that one probable impact of our proposals would be to reduce the number of 
merger-related class actions filed and prosecuted in Delaware Chancery Court. Professors Macey 
and Miller have set forth a public choice theory of corporate law that suggests that Delaware 
courts have an interest in promoting a fairly high level of corporate litigation, so as to generate 
income for Delaware attorneys and, indirectly, for the State of Delaware. See Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. 
L.Rev. 469 (1987). We have no reason to believe that such considerations lie behind the 
Delaware courts’ relatively lax approach to monitoring class action settlements and attorney fee 
requests. However, if they do, there would appear to be little prospect that Delaware courts will 
respond favorably to our proposals. 
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it would be both feasible and desirable for the Chancery Court to signal that it is not necessarily 
antagonistic to efforts to involve it in the lead plaintiff/lead counsel appointment process, so as to 
encourage institutional investors and other substantial shareholders to become more actively 
involved in merger-related class actions.173  
 
Absent judicial intervention, the traditional plaintiffs’ bar is highly unlikely to relinquish 
voluntarily to attorneys representing ’real’ clients174 the control it currently exercises over most 
merger-related class actions. Moreover, if the Chancery Court continues to signal to institutional 
investors that it usually will react with annoyance to efforts on their part to enlist its help in 
obtaining control of merger-related class actions, institutions are likely to decide that it doesn’t 
pay even to make such efforts.  To avoid this outcome, when future cases arise in which 
institutional investors seek to become lead plaintiffs and to have their attorneys appointed lead 
counsel, the court should clarify that whatever antagonism it has expressed toward efforts to 
involve it at this stage of litigation pertains only to internecine spats within the plaintiffs’ bar -- 
that it does not extend to efforts by attorneys with ’real’” clients, proceeding on the basis of 
well-researched pleadings, to gain control of class actions from plaintiffs’ attorneys whose 
claims to control are based largely on the fact that they were the first to file a class action 
complaint.  
 
Our second suggestion concerns pleading standards. In their most recent paper, 
Professors Thompson and Thomas conclude that derivative suits, when filed on behalf of 
shareholders of public corporations, generate relatively few litigation-related agency costs, in 
large part because the demand requirement and the possibility of special litigation committee 
review discourage opportunistic litigation.175 As we point out above, Delaware law imposes no 
comparable constraints on merger-related class actions, and, in part as a consequence, 
opportunistic class action litigation appears to be common.  Class action complaints frequently 
are filed for strictly tactical reasons -- almost half of the complaints we studied were dismissed 
voluntarily without the attorneys who filed them undertaking any significant additional litigation 
efforts -- and very few of the remaining complaints ultimately lead to the realization of 
significant benefits by the shareholders on whose behalf they ostensibly are filed.  
 
  173 Given the outcomes of the suits described in Part IV.E, we believe that increased 
involvement by institutional and other substantial investors is apt to be beneficial to shareholders 
generally. 
 
  174 We note that some of the firms that we have identified as part of the traditional plaintiffs’ 
bar also regularly represent institutional investors in securities class actions. It seems reasonable 
to anticipate that, were the Chancery Court to signal its receptivity to appointing institutional 
investors as lead plaintiffs, many of those firms would redirect their efforts from racing to the 
courthouse to encouraging “real” clients with substantial financial stakes to become involved 
more frequently in merger-related class actions. 
 
  175 See Robert B Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, [cite article in this issue]. 
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The Delaware Supreme Court may have sound reasons to continue to impose on 
corporate directors and controlling shareholders the burden of proving, with respect to a variety 
of merger-related decisions, that they proceeded in conformity with the relevant standard of 
review. But, it seems to us, so assigning the burden of proof does not necessarily require the 
court to rule, as it did in Krasner v. Moffett, that a bare bones complaint176 should not be 
dismissed. Rather, we believe that in cases where defendants have the burden of proof, the court 
nonetheless should dismiss class action complaints unless plaintiffs plead particularized facts 
that, if true, would create a reasonable doubt that defendants failed to satisfy  (or are reasonably 
likely not to satisfy) the relevant standard of review.177 In addition, the court should consider 
further discouraging the filing of frivolous or entirely speculative class action complaints by 
encouraging imposition of sanctions on attorneys whose complaints clearly fall short of this 
standard or on attorneys who file complaints that they then seek to dismiss voluntarily without 
making any significant efforts to prosecute the claims advanced therein.178
 
Finally, and most importantly, Delaware courts should begin to review far more 
rigorously requests for attorney fee awards. It is the prospect of fee awards, Delaware courts 
have acknowledged, that motivates the plaintiffs’ bar. Now those courts must recognize that it is 
essential that they use their power over fee awards to motivate the plaintiffs’ bar to re-shape its 
class action litigation efforts.  
 
In Parts II and III of this paper we lay bare -- convincingly, we believe -- the litigation 
dynamics that appear to underlie the vast majority of settlements of merger-related class actions. 
Most monetary settlements appear to involve free riding at best and tacit collusion at worst. All 
but a few non-monetary settlements appear to result from plaintiffs’ attorneys’ ability to threaten 
to impose litigation costs on defendants. Yet Delaware courts, by and large, appear to have 
ignored the litigation dynamics that gave rise to these settlements. Instead, in case after case, 
those courts have tended to rubber-stamp whatever fee requests were made by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, so long as defendants did not object.179 By so proceeding, those courts have failed to 
 
 176 One that alleges no more than that such a decision was made (or will be made) and that the 
directors or controlling shareholder who made it (or will make it) breached the relevant standard 
of review. 
 
177 We believe that the court should adopt a pleading standard somewhat more rigorous than that 
set by Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but somewhat less rigorous than that set by 
§ 21(d)(b) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2004). 
 
 178 Adopting such an approach to pleading standards and sanctions also should have a salutary, 
secondary effect: slowing the race to the courthouse. 
 
 179 Except in the two cases in which objectors serendipitously appeared and urged the courts to 
take account of the impact of the relevant litigation dynamics. 
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fulfill the monitoring role that their judicially-created system of privatized enforcement assumes 
they will play. 
 
 At least two changes seem to us to be essential. First, the Delaware Supreme Court 
should reconsider its decisions in Tandycrafts and United Vanguard Fund. The presumption that 
they create --- that any benefits realized by the plaintiff class after a class action has been filed 
were caused, at least in part, by the litigation efforts of plaintiffs’ attorneys --- appears to us to be 
counter-factual, especially as it applies to cases in which plaintiffs’ attorneys have an 
opportunity to free ride on the efforts of others. In addition, that presumption and the related 
burden of proof180 increase dramatically plaintiffs’ attorneys’ leverage when bargaining for an 
attorneys’ fee award in cases in which they can free ride on the efforts of others and, as such, 
also may promote settlements that are tacitly collusive.  Perhaps most importantly, they limit 
dramatically the Chancery Court’s ability to deny fees in such cases. 
  
 
 The best solution would be for the Supreme Court to eliminate the presumption in favor 
of a fee award whenever the class realizes some post-filing benefit.181 At a minimum, the Court 
should emphasize that its holdings in Tandycrafts and United Vanguard Fund are subject to its 
prior holding in Chrysler Corp. v. Dann to the effect that before a plaintiffs’ attorney is entitled 
to a fee award, she must demonstrate that at the time she filed her complaint, she “possesse[d] 
knowledge of provable facts which h[e]ld out some reasonable likelihood of ultimate success.”182 
In many cases -- particularly those in which the initial complaint was filed before the terms of a 
squeeze out or MBO have been finalized -- strict enforcement of this standard will reduce 
considerably the ability of plaintiffs’ attorneys to demand unjustified fee awards. 
 
Second, when it reviews settlements and requests for attorneys’ fees, the Chancery Court 
should take account of the litigation dynamics described above. Where plaintiffs’ attorneys 
appear largely to have free ridden on the efforts of others or to have succeeded primarily because 
they were able to threaten to impose unnecessary litigation costs on defendants, any fee awards 
should be parsimonious.183   
 
 
 180 Defendants can rebut the presumption only by proving that the class action “did not in any 
way cause their [subsequent] action.” United Vanguard Fund, note __, supra (emphasis added). 
 
 181 Plaintiffs’ attorneys then would be required to prove that those benefits were the product of 
those attorneys’ efforts.  
 
  182 See note __ (emphasis added). 
 
 183 If the court concludes that a settlement is the product of tacit collusion between plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and defendants, it probably should refuse to approve the settlement. Courts outside of 
Delaware have denied fee awards to plaintiffs’ attorneys in a number of recent corporate cases, 
where they concluded that plaintiffs’ attorneys had free ridden on the efforts of others or where 
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So changing the manner in which the Chancery Court reviews settlements and fee 
requests no doubt initially would add to its already heavy workload. But we believe that such an 
effort nonetheless would prove to be worthwhile. A series of parsimonious fee awards would 
send a clear and important message to the plaintiffs’ bar -- free riding and prosecution of 
nuisance litigation no longer will be profitable. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, if they want to continue to 
receive the generous fee awards to which they have become accustomed, will have to change 
their approach to merger-related litigation. In the future, they will have to shift their focus to 
identifying mergers in which shareholders really are not being treated fairly and then litigating 
vigorously to protect those shareholders’ interests. Merger-related class actions probably would 
become far less common, but those that are filed and prosecuted then are likely to produce far 
more in the way of genuine protection of shareholders’ interests. In short, the benefits envisioned 
by the Delaware courts when they decided to privatize enforcement of merger-related fiduciary 
duties might actually be realized.  
 
  
 
they found that plaintiffs tactical efforts had produced no significant benefits for the shareholders 
that they purported to represent. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1999) (free 
riding on settlement of related employment litigation); Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 265 
F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2001) (tactical efforts produced no benefits);  Fruchter v. Florida Progress 
Corporation, 2002 WL 1558220 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 3/20/02) (analogizing plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
“squeegee boys” who operate on urban street corners). Professor Weiss, as counsel, drafted an 
objection to the attorneys’ fee request that was filed by his colleague, Professor Hoffman, in 
Fruchter. 
Table 1: Mean and Median Values for Qualifyinga Mergers, 1999-2001 
 
 
 
Variable 
Mergers 
with 
Lawsuits
Mergers 
without 
Lawsuits
 
Significant 
Difference?b
 Mergers
with 
Lawsuits
 Mergers 
without 
Lawsuits
 
Significant 
Difference?b
Number of mergers 104 460   104 460
 Mean Values  Median Values 
Value of deal ($million) 6,170 1,999 Yes (p = 0.034)  772 544 No (p = 0.082)
Annual sales of target ($million) 3,176 914 Yes (p = 0.003)  646 193 Yes (p = 0.000)
Net income of target ($million) 162 20 Yes (p = 0.003)  30 7 Yes (p = 0.000)
Assets of target  ($million) 6,942 2,690 Yes (p = 0.038)  788 339 Yes (p = 0.000)
Common equity of target ($million) 1,359 428 Yes (p = 0.001)  264 121 Yes (p = 0.000)
First-day premium (%) offered by acquirorc 28.4 37.7 Yes (p = 0.002)  21.4 30.8 Yes (p = 0.003)
% of mergers that were all cash 64.4 28.5 Yes (p = 0.000)  
% of mergers where acquiror has a prior 
stake or other allegations of self-dealing 65.4 4.6
 
Yes (p = 0.000) 
 
 
a Mergers where the target company is a publicly traded company that is incorporated in Delaware and where the transaction has a 
value of $100 million or more. 
b At a 95% confidence level 
c Initial percent premium of offer price per share over previous (pre-announcement) day closing share price 
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Table 2: Mean and Median Values for Qualifyinga Mergers, 1999 
 
 
 
Variable 
Mergers 
with 
Lawsuits
Mergers 
without 
Lawsuits
 
Significant 
Difference?b
 Mergers
with 
Lawsuits
 Mergers 
without 
Lawsuits
 
Significant 
Difference?b
Number of mergers 37 192   37 192
 Mean Values  Median Values 
Value of deal ($million) 6,121 1,586 No (p = 0.123)  785 538 No (p = 0.199)
Annual sales of target ($million) 1,357 759 No (p = 0.148)  556 202 Yes (p = 0.006)
Net income of target ($million) 92 10 No (p = 0.120)  20 8 No (p = 0.089)
Assets of target  ($million) 2,103 1,363 No (p = 0.292)  547 326 Yes (p = 0.018)
Common equity of target ($million) 804 342 No (p = 0.081)  241 104 Yes (p = 0.000)
First-day premium (%) offered by acquirorc 20.7 35.1 Yes (p = 0.000)  18.4 28.5 Yes (p = 0.008)
% of mergers that were all cash        56.7 26.0 Yes (p = 0.001)  
% of mergers where acquiror has a prior 
stake or other allegations of self-dealing 43.2 5.2
 
Yes (p = 0.000) 
 
 
a Mergers where the target company is a publicly traded company that is incorporated in Delaware and where the transaction has a 
value of $100 million or more. 
b At a 95% confidence level 
c Initial percent premium of offer price per share over previous (pre-announcement) day closing share price 
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Table 3: Mean and Median Values for Qualifyinga Mergers, 2000 
 
 
 
Variable 
Mergers 
with 
Lawsuits
Mergers 
without 
Lawsuits
 
Significant 
Difference?b
 Mergers
with 
Lawsuits
 Mergers 
without 
Lawsuits
 
Significant 
Difference?b
Number of mergers 47 169   47 169
 Mean Values  Median Values 
Value of deal ($million) 7,863 2,677 No (p = 0.163)  935 529 No (p = 0.138)
Annual sales of target ($million) 4,060 916 Yes (p = 0.013)  1,037 169 Yes (p = 0.000)
Net income of target ($million) 255 36 Yes (p = 0.007)  39 7 Yes (p = 0.000)
Assets of target  ($million) 10,961 4,793 No (p = 0.163)  1,764 285 Yes (p = 0.000)
Common equity of target ($million) 1,867 496 Yes (p = 0.012)  280 111 Yes (p = 0.000)
First-day premium (%) offered by acquirorc 32.5 42.5 No (p = 0.060)  23.2 34.6 No (p = 0.070)
% of mergers that were all cash 68.1 32.0 No (p = 0.000)  
% of mergers where acquiror has a prior 
stake or other allegations of self-dealing 76.6 4.7
 
Yes (p = 0.000) 
 
 
a Mergers where the target company is a publicly traded company that is incorporated in Delaware and where the transaction has a 
value of $100 million or more. 
b At a 95% confidence level 
c Initial percent premium of offer price per share over previous (pre-announcement) day closing share price 
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Table 4: Mean and Median Values for Qualifyinga Mergers, 2001 
 
 
 
Variable 
Mergers 
with 
Lawsuits
Mergers 
without 
Lawsuits
 
Significant 
Difference?b
 Mergers
with 
Lawsuits
 Mergers 
without 
Lawsuits
 
Significant 
Difference?b
Number of mergers 20 99   20 99
 Mean Values  Median Values 
Value of deal ($million) 2,286 1,596 No (p = 0.462)  408 565 No (p = 0.347)
Annual sales of target ($million) 4,461 1,213 No (p = 0.183)  566 208 Yes (p = 0.003)
Net income of target ($million) 76 12 No (p = 0.636)  39 7 No (p = 0.111)
Assets of target  ($million) 6,447 1,676 No (p = 0.103)  732 561 No (p = 0.539)
Common equity of target ($million) 1,191 480 No (p = 0.139)  292 164 Yes (p = 0.013)
First-day premium (%) offered by acquirorc 33.2 34.8 No (p = 0.838)  24.4 31.1 No (p = 0.653)
% of mergers that were all cash 70.0 27.3 Yes (p = 0.001)  
% of mergers where acquiror has a prior 
stake or other allegations of self-dealing 80.0 2.0
 
Yes (p = 0.000) 
 
 
a Mergers where the target company is a publicly traded company that is incorporated in Delaware and where the transaction has a 
value of $100 million or more. 
b At a 95% confidence level 
c Initial percent premium of offer price per share over previous (pre-announcement) day closing share price
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Table 5: Logit Regressions: 1999-2001 
Dependent variable: Law suit filed (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Constant -2.77 
(9.25) 
-7.30 
(7.62) 
-2.66 
(9.31) 
-4.73 
(7.47) 
-2.54 
(9.19) 
-2.35 
(8.97) 
-5.39 
(7.51) 
-2.74 
(9.32) 
Acquiror prior stake 
or self-dealing (1,0) 
3.63 
(10.61
) 
3.74 
(10.27
) 
3.49 
(10.50
) 
3.38 
(9.90) 
3.48 
(11.45
) 
3.46 
(10.59
) 
3.38 
(9.88) 
3.48 
(10.34
) 
All cash (1,0) 1.23 
(3.73) 
1.67 
(4.55) 
0.99 
(3.15) 
0.95 
(2.98) 
0.97 
(3.10) 
0.83 
(2.72) 
1.18 
(3.56) 
1.12 
(3.46) 
First-day % premium -0.02 
(3.19) 
-0.02
(3.00)
-0.01
(2.51)
-0.02
(2.63)
-0.02
(2.60)
-0.02 
(2.74) 
-0.02
(2.53)
-0.02
(2.769
)
Deal valuea 0.10 
(4.87) 
 
Ln (deal value)  0.68 
(5.84) 
  
Target salesa  0.13
(3.85)
   
Ln (sales)  0.40
(4.61)
 
Target net incomea,b  1.82
(4.12)
 
Target assetsa  0.01 
(1.78) 
 
Ln (assets)   0.45
(5.06)
 
Target common 
equitya,b
  0.36
(4.97)
   
Pseudo R 2 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.42
n 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 564
 
a In $ billions 
b Because of negative values, log regressions for net income and for common equity were not 
performed 
  
 
 63
 
Table 6: Logit Regressions: 1999 
Dependent variable: Law suit filed (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Constant -2.15 
(5.28) 
-7.42 
(4.79
) 
-1.99 
(5.07) 
-3.76 
(4.13) 
-1.91 
(5.10
) 
-1.84 
(5.03) 
-5.11 
(4.41
) 
-2.09 
(5.29) 
Acquiror prior stake 
(or self-dealing) (1,0) 
2.30 
(4.41) 
2.74 
(4.86
) 
2.22 
(4.38) 
2.28 
(4.42) 
2.19 
(4.26
) 
2.26 
(4.49) 
2.30 
(4.37
) 
2.24 
(4.39) 
All cash (1,0) 1.38 
(2.93) 
1.90 
(3.52
) 
1.14 
(2.53) 
1.15 
(2.50) 
1.17 
(2.58
) 
1.08 
(2.44) 
1.49 
(2.99
) 
1.30 
(2.78)
First-day % premium -0.03 
(-2.56) 
-0.03
(2.38
)
-0.03
(2.49)
-0.03
(2.51)
-0.03
(2.53
)
-0.03 
(2.58) 
-0.03 
(2.37
) 
-0.03
(2.54)
Deal valuea 0.11 
(2.60) 
  
Ln (deal value)  0.77 
(3.98
) 
   
Target salesa  0.18
(1.75)
    
Ln (sales)  0.34
(2.53)
  
Target net incomea,b  2.62
(1.96
)
  
Target assetsa  0.04 
(1.32) 
  
Ln (assets)   0.50 
(3.23
) 
Target common 
equitya,b
   0.43
(2.83)
    
Pseudo R 2 0.28 0.31 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.26
n 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229
 
a In $ billions 
b Because of negative values, log regressions for net income and for common equity were not 
performed 
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Table 7: Logit Regressions: 2000 
Dependent variable: Law suit filed (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Constant -3.20 
(5.34) 
-7.49 
(4.71) 
3.27 
(5.57) 
-4.94 
(4.48) 
-3.00 
(5.44) 
-2.52 
(5.21) 
-5.36 
(4.57) 
-3.15 
(5.47) 
Acquiror prior stake 
or self-dealing (1,0) 
4.24 
(7.38) 
4.09 
(7.02) 
4.11 
(7.36) 
3.59 
(6.74) 
4.00 
(7.36) 
3.88 
(7.47) 
3.62 
(6.78) 
3.97 
(7.23) 
All cash (1,0) 1.39 
(2.37) 
1.67 
(2.68) 
1.05 
(1.87) 
0.82 
(1.56) 
1.06 
(1.92) 
0.75 
(1.45) 
  1.06 
(1.92) 
1.15 
(2.05) 
First-day % premium -0.02 
(2.05) 
-0.02
(1.83)
-0.01
(1.28)
-0.01
(1.36)
-0.01
(1.39)
-0.01 
(1.48) 
-0.01
(1.22)
-0.01
(1.31)
Deal valuea 0.10 
(3.55) 
 
Ln (deal value)  0.66 
(3.64) 
  
Target salesa  0.20
(3.68)
   
Ln (sales)  0.41
(2.84)
 
Target net incomea,b  1.98
(3.59)
  
Target assetsa  0.01 
(1.16) 
 
Ln (assets)   0.41
(3.08)
Target common 
equitya,b
  0.36
(3.71)
   
Pseudo R 2 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.46 0.50 0.52
n 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216
 
a In $ billions 
b Because of negative values, log regressions for net income and for common equity were not 
performed 
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Table 8: Logit Regressions: 2001 
Dependent variable: Law suit filed (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Constant -3.70 
(4.23) 
-7.12 
(2.63
) 
-3.71 
(4.20) 
-7.58 
(3.68) 
3.37 
(4.27
) 
-4.27 
(4.10) 
-8.17 
(3.36
) 
-3.74 
(4.33) 
Acquiror prior stake or 
self-dealing (1,0) 
5.39 
(5.20) 
5.42 
(4.97
) 
5.28 
(5.10) 
6.00 
(4.61) 
5.34 
(5.23
) 
5.85 
(4.94) 
5.93 
(4.60
) 
5.35 
(5.15) 
All cash (1,0) 1.00 
(1.00) 
1.27 
(1.18
) 
0.97 
(0.98) 
1.08 
(1.04) 
0.70 
(0.74
) 
1.39 
(1.26) 
1.12 
(1.10
) 
1.02 
(1.02)
First-day % premium -0.01 
(0.82) 
-0.01
(0.92
)
-0.01
(0.56)
-0.02
(0.89)
-0.01
(0.59
)
-0.02 
(1.15) 
-0.02 
(0.95
) 
-0.01
(0.84)
Deal valuea 0.17 
(2.18) 
  
Ln (deal value)  0.58 
(1.69
) 
   
Target salesa  0.10
(2.45)
    
Ln (sales)  0.69
(2.68)
  
Target net incomea,b  1.95
(1.80
)
  
Target assetsa  0.15 
(3.05) 
  
Ln (assets)   0.71 
(2.46
) 
Target common 
equitya,b
   0.44
(2.36)
    
Pseudo R 2 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.61 0.69 0.64 0.64
n 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119
 
a In $ billions 
b Because of negative values, log regressions for net income and for common equity were not 
performed 
 
 
  
 
 66

 
Table 9: OLS Regressions, 1999-2001 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Dependent var.: Ln (legal fee/case) Ln (legal fee/case) Ln (hourly rate/case) Ln (hourly rate/case) 
Constant 4.79 
(6.15) 
4.17 
(6.71) 
0.617 
(10.99) 
6.52 
(12.96) 
Non-monetary 
settlement 
-1.17 
(3.36) 
-1.32 
(4.61) 
-1.13 
(4.36) 
-1.28 
(5.09) 
Ln (target assets) 0.31 
(3.16) 
  0.15
(2.20) 
 
Ln (deal value)  0.44 
(5.04) 
  0.12
(1.75) 
Court-ordered 
reduction 
-0.12 
(0.31) 
-0.31 
(0.91) 
-0.37 
(1.37) 
-0.43 
(1.57) 
     
R2 0.46    0.58 0.52 0.50
n     47 47 43 43
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Table 10: Cases Where the Delaware Courts Awarded Less than All Fees Requested 
 
 
No objection filed 
 
Name     Judge   % reduction 
 
IBP                      Strine    69% 
Petco                    Lamb     37% 
MascoTech                Strine    33% 
CB Richard Ellis         Strine    21% 
PepsiAmericas            Strine       9% 
 
 
Objection filed 
 
Name     Judge   % reduction 
 
BancTec                  Strine    90% 
Donna Karan              Strine    78% 
 
Note:  These are cases where plaintiffs’ attorneys were from the “traditional” Delaware plaintiffs’ 
bar.
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 Figure 1: Means of M&A Deal Values
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 Figure 2: Means of Annual Sales of M&A Targets
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 Figure 3: Means of Net Income of M&A Targets
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 Figure 4: Means of Assets of M&A Targets
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 Figure 5: Means of Common Equity of M&A Targets
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 Figure 6: Means of M&A First-Day Premium
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 Figure 7: % of M&A Deals That Were All Cash
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 Figure 8: % of M&A Deals Where Acquirer Had Prior Stake or Conflict
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l of Litigation Outcomes and Legal Fees, 1999-2001 
 
 
 
 
Legal fees received: Total amounts/case 
Average: $2,814,000 
Median: $875,000 
Range: $250,000-$14,9000,000 
 
Legal fees received: Hourly rates/case 
Average: $1,800/hr 
Median: $1,240/hr 
Range: $230/hr-$4,900/hr 
Monetary 
recovery: 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lawsuits: 104 
Dismissed: 54 
Settlements: 48 
Pending: 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal fees received: Total amounts/case 
Average: $351,000 
Median: $312,000 
Range: $25,000-$1,400,000 
 
Legal fees received: Hourly rates/case 
 monetary 
overy: 17 
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recFigure 9: A Schematic PortrayaAverage: $492/hr 
Median: $472/hr 
Range: $41/hr-$1,160/hr 
